Is epistemic injustice a worthy application to mental health nurse education?

Abstract

This paper explores the philosophical concept of epistemic injustice and contends its significance and relevance to mental health nurse education and clinical practice. The term epistemic injustice may be unfamiliar to mental health nurses, yet the effects are readily visible in the dismissing, silencing, and doubting of service users' knowledge, testimony, and interpretation. Existing professional values and clinical standards lack depth and critical exploration pertaining to epistemology and associated ethical concerns. Despite central tenets of person-centred care and valuing the service users' voice, epistemic injustice continues to occur. Epistemic injustice cannot be summed up merely by asking nurses to listen to service users. This represents an oversimplification of epistemology, ignoring the complexities of social influence and knowledge exchanges. Epistemic injustice brings something new and innovative to the nursing curriculum and fits within the principles of heutagogy. It encourages deep reflexivity surrounding the ethical issues of power inequalities and intersectionality. Inclusion in mental health nursing education allows for the social and political powers of psychiatric diagnosis as a form of silencing and stigma to be examined. Practical application is made to mental health nursing education and practice with epistemological values and ethical reflexive prompts. These can be utilised by educators and lecturers for pre-registration mental health nurse education, post-registration, and continued professional development.