Is all the News Bad News for Peace?

Abstract

ACADEMIC AND POLICY CIRCLES have recently devoted much attention to agendas in civil wars. Their findings: the economic functions of violence contribute significantly to the duration of civil wars; they also pose serious obstacles to conflict resolution. This article takes another look at the impact of economic agendas on the attitudes of belligerents to conflict resolution. I argue that the economic activities of insurgents can become a source of political and military vulnerability and thus contribute to decisions to negotiate a peace settlement.After a brief methodological note on research into economic agendas in civil wars and a review of the main findings of the literature on the subject, I challenge the prevailing understanding of the impact of economic agendas on the course of civil wars and use the example of the Lebanese Forces, the main Christian militia in the Lebanese civil war (1975-90), to illustrate the connection between economic agendas, strength, and vulnerability.(f.1)DEFINITIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUESThe term 'economic agendas' refers to the belligerents' involvement in black-market activities, ranging from transactions carried out 'off the books,' which are not different in substance from regular economic transactions, to criminal endeavours, which, by their very nature, contravene the law. Underground economic activities differ from conventional economic transactions in three respects:(f.2) - Unregulated: Since they are kept secret from governments, they fall outside the purview of a multitude of laws regulating exchanges of commodities and labour. - Untaxed: They do not generate tax revenues for the state or contribute to social security programmes. - Unmeasured: They are reflected in no official statistics on the economy.The nature of the activities raises special methodological problems that account, in part, for the relative dearth of empirical studies. Connections to the criminal 'underworld' shroud war economies in a secrecy that hinders efforts to obtain tangible evidence of theoretical claims. The context of civil wars, with the attending disruption of normal life, makes data collection arduous and research in the field hazardous.Within these limitations, it is, nonetheless, possible to sketch the role of the black market in the decision-making of the Lebanese Forces.(f.3) Indeed, this is a particularly instructive case. When the structures of the state collapse, as they did in Lebanon during the civil war, belligerents are often able to secure control over territorial enclaves wrested away from the state. The underground economy becomes the main economic activity within these enclaves. This may not necessarily increase the transparency of specific transactions; it does, however, provide a better sense of the scope and nature of the belligerents' economic undertakings.ECONOMIC AGENDAS IN CIVIL WARSAlthough relatively new to academic analysis, the study of economic agendas in civil wars has already generated a significant body of literature, which can usefully be divided into two main streams. One emphasizes greed as a primary motivation of violence; the other situates the economic agendas of combatants within the framework of efforts to address grievances.(f.4)When the motive is greed, violence is aimed at circumventing the law. Its immediate functions are local rather than national in scope. When a state collapses, military capabilities give warlords the means to extract economic resources for private profit.(f.5) Violence becomes a continuation of economics by other means.(f.6) Therefore, there is more to war than winning; for bandits or warlords it is logical to perpetuate conflict as a means of pursing economic interests. The policy implications are stark. There can be little prospect for conflict resolution as long as economic benefits flow to combatants. Sanctions, such as economic embargoes, may be the only available means to force combatants to the negotiating table. …