Is a Mummy a Person or a Property: The Classification and Choice of Law of Cultural Objects in Private International Law

Abstract

Abstract In the Buddha Mummy Statue case, the Chinese village committees sued the Dutch defendants for the return of a stolen golden statue that contains a mummified Buddha. The parties had different opinions on the legal nature of the mummy contained in the statue. The Chinese court classified the statue as a cultural property and applied the choice of law over movable properties provided in Article 37 of the Chinese Private International Law Act (lex rei sitae). Based on a comparative study, this article argues that a mummy does not fall within the traditional dichotomy between a person and a property. Instead, a mummy should be classified as a transitional existence between a person and a property. If the classification of a mummy has to be confined to the traditional dichotomy, a mummy can be regarded as a quasi-person or a special kind of property. Following this new classification, a new choice-of-law rule should be established. In this regard, the Belgian Private International Law Act, which adopts the lex originis rule, supplemented by the lex rei sitae rule, is a forerunner. This article advocates that the adoption of the lex originis rule may help to stop the vicious circle of illegal possession of stolen cultural objects and facilitate the return of stolen cultural objects, especially those containing human remains, to their country of origin.