Iran's Forgotten Kurds

Abstract

Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 43, No.2, Winter 2020 Iran’s Forgotten Kurds Michael M. Gunter* Introduction Although the approximately 8 million Kurds in Iran are second in numbers only to those in Turkey and constitute maybe 11 percent of Iran’s entire population, they have become all but forgotten. Unlike the Arabs and the Turks, the Persians are closely related to the Kurds. This ethnic affinity at times has possibly served to moderate Kurdish national demands in Iran. Nevertheless, the Kurds in Iran at the least have long pursued their separate cultural and social identity in one form or another. In addition, most of the Kurds in Iran are Sunnis, which creates problems with the Shiite Iranian government. The purpose of this paper is to explain why the Iranian Kurds (Eastern Kurdistan or Rojhelat) are largely forgotten compared to their kin in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, but in so doing also analyze their current situation. This will be done against the backdrop of change and continuity in Kurdish-Iranian relations. A significant number of Iranian Kurds live in the northwestern province of Kordestan, the only province in all pan-Kurdistan that bears this Kurdish ethnic name, which in the past has often been banned from being used in the other states in which the Kurds live. The Kurds in Iran also live in four other Iranian provinces: Western Azerbaijan, Kirmanshah, Hamadin, and Ilam. In addition, there is a community of Kurds in the northern part of Khorasan province in northeastern Iran that was forcefully relocated there during the eighteenth century to disperse and thus better control the ethnic and religious composition of the Persian Empire. Finally, in recent decades many Kurds have also moved to Tehran to seek better employment and living opportunities. Kurds (unlike the Turkic Azeris) have been barred from high levels of power in Iran, and human rights violations are systematically carried out 54 *Michael M. Gunter is a professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University in Cookeville, TN. He is an authority on Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, has written eleven books on the Kurdish struggle, and has co-edited eight books. Gunter is a board member of the Center for Eurasian Studies. He is frequently consulted by media members for analysis and comment on breaking news in the Middle East. 55 against them. In January 2009, for example, Human Rights Watch documented how Iranian authorities use security laws, press laws, and other legislation to arrest and prosecute Iranian Kurds solely for trying to exercise their right to freedom of expression and association. The government has closed Persian- and Kurdish-language newspapers and journals, banned books, and punished publishers, journalists, and writers for opposing and criticizing government policies.1 Amnesty International also expressed concern over the treatment of ethnic Kurdish prisoners of conscience. Kurdish representatives have testified how ethnic Kurds are denied education in their own language. Kurds are not allowed to give their children certain Kurdish names; Sunni Muslim Kurds face discrimination because of their religion; women’s rights are denied; and economic opportunities are bleak.2 In June 2012, US assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor Michael Posner denounced continuing negative trends in Iran toward its Kurdish population: “Intolerance, of dissent…; free speech restricted; internet freedom restricted; political participation severely circumscribed; unfair trials; amputations; floggings; lots of death penalty…. So, it is a very grim picture.”3 History of the Kurds during the Ottoman period. Sheikh Ubeydullah In 1880, Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri—a devout and highly revered religious leader—led possibly the most significant Kurdish revolt of the nineteenth century in the area along the Ottoman-Persian border. This ultimately unsuccessful uprising is sometimes said to have been the prototype for subsequent Kurdish revolts in the twentieth century. Explaining his actions, Sheikh Ubeydullah famously wrote the consulgeneral of Great Britain in Tabriz that “the Kurdish nation…is a people apart…. We also are a nation apart. We want our affairs to be in our own hands.”4 Indeed, in his seminal work on Kurdish studies, Wadie Jwaideh concluded concerning the sheikh that “as the old parochial interests of a local leader gave...