Investing in Fighters and Alliances

Abstract

In the spring of 1975 Norway and Denmark were faced with the choice of how to replace their aging fleets of fighter jets. Together with Belgium and the Netherlands, the two Nordic countries had established a buyers' consortium to ensure NATO standardization and a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis the potential suppliers; hence Copenhagen and Oslo were in very similar situations. As the final decision was about to be made, three candidate planes were still in the competition: the American F-16, the Swedish Saab Viggen, and the French Dassault Mirage. After a drawn-out and exceedingly complex decision-making process, the four European NATO members together opted for the American contender. Surely, the Danish and Norwegian decision to procure the F-16 had several reasons behind it- importantly, most policymakers in both Copenhagen and Oslo considered the American aircraft to be technically superior to its competitors-but the choice of the F-16 was in no small part motivated by old-fashioned realpolitik. The purchase of new fighter jets was thus not only perceived as a procurement of new military equipment but also an investment in alliances and the transatlantic link. Accordingly, Norway and Denmark chose the American F-16 partly because this aircraft was thought to bring the greatest strategic benefits.1Almost 40 years later, Norway and Denmark are once again engaged in the procurement of new fighter jets. Their F-16 fleets are aging and will most likely be phased out within a decade. As during the Cold War, the two Scandinavian countries have had the choice between candidate planes from the United States (F-35 I°int Strike Fighter, or JSF, and F-18 Super Hornet), Sweden (SAAB Gripen NG), and Europe (Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Aviation's Rafale). And exactly as in the mid-1970s, the Norwegian parliament, the Storting, has moved ahead of its Danish counterpart and picked an American plane-the F-35 JSF. As of November 2012, the Danish parliament, the Folketing, has yet to decide the type of fighter jets that will replace the Danish F-i6s. But among experts and pundits, the JSF has long been considered a strong favourite to win the competition.In this article I examine and compare Danish and Norwegian decisionmaking on the purchase of replacement fighter jets. The aim of this article is, first and foremost, to determine the extent to which the two countries' inclinations to buy the F-35 have been motivated by political and alliancerelated considerations. I thus pose the question: Is the American F-35 preferred essentially because it is an American aircraft? Or is it simply perceived to be the most promising and cost-effective choice? Second, I investigate the limited use of political or alliance-related arguments in the national debates on the procurement plans. In other words, I ask why key policymakers have apparently done their best to keep political lines of reasoning out of the public discourse. Why has the acquisition program's possible effect on the two countries' position within NATO and vis-a-vis the US been effectively downplayed by policymakers as a criterion for the final selection?The article presents two main arguments. One is that Norway and Denmark's preference for the JSF has in fact been influenced by political considerations and the aspiration to maintain close ties to Washington. The two North European small states are not only investing in high-tech military equipment, but also in strategic alliances. At the same time, however, military experts and the political leadership in both Oslo and Copenhagen have clearly deemed the F-35 to be the most promising candidate and the most technically advanced. The second main argument presented here is that key political actors in both countries have chosen not to air their political motivations for deciding on the F-35 because they have feared that this type of argumentation would not resonate well with public attitudes and their political partners. …