Investigation of Frankfurt's Argument on Moral Responsibility

Tavakkol Koohi Giglou,Habib Asadi,Javad Danesh

doi:10.5539/jpl.v9n3p63

Abstract

The common thought of Christian and Moslem philosophers considers moral responsibility of a person as dependent on his or her ability to choose from several options. However, Harry Frankfurt in his famous paper " alternate possibilities and moral responsibility" challenges freedom condition for moral responsibility with implicit reasons and makes use of several examples to show that it is completely possible for a person to be considered as morally responsible despite failure to access any kind of alternate possible. However, there are two reasons presented by Frankfurt that contrary to his claims show that presence of alternate possibilities or at least imagination for presence of alternatives is the base for responsibility or difficulty of moralactor and if sometimes anactor is regarded as responsible despite absence of alternate possible, this is resulted from his or her "ignorance" of the matter and also the impact of his "intention" in doing action. One of the main defects of theories which deal with moral responsibility conditions is ignoring the intention and purpose of moralactor. This is while ethics domain includes internal actions like intention and will of moral actor as well as apparent actions.

Highlights

The background of humans philosophical thought believes that moral responsibility depends on the ability to select alternate possible ( Adams, 1986,pp.1-35)
Frankfurt did not specify that whether his assumed intervener is a conditional intervener whose intervention starts in contrast to the plot ad intention of the intervener causally from the beginning of every action and blocks unfavorable action or is a "counterfactual intervention" whose intervention starts not because of actor's attempt or starting an action which is against intervener's plot but because of an event which is a certain sign of the fact that the actor will act or select against the intention of the intervener in case of absence of another intervener
There is an important problem in Frankfurt's argument and that is contrary to Frankfurt's idea, none of the two statements of indirect reasoning on incompatibility of moral responsibility and causal determinationdoes not reject the responsibility as a result of alternate possibility benefits in case of presence of causal necessity

Summary

Introduction

The background of humans philosophical thought believes that moral responsibility depends on the ability to select alternate possible ( Adams, 1986,pp.1-35). In this example, Babak is morally responsible for killing the mayor, he did not have any alternate possibility and was not able to avoid this action.

Results

Conclusion