Abstract
According to Rosset's dual-process model of intention attribution, our judgements of intentionality can be guided either by an automatic process leading to intentional explanations of behaviour or by a higher-level and cognitively more demanding process enabling unintentional explanations of behaviour. Based on this model, under conditions of compromised cognitive capacity, individuals should judge more behaviour to be intentional rather than unintentional. This prediction was tested in one lab-based experiment and one online experiment. Specifically, we investigated whether increased working memory load would lead to higher intentionality endorsement of ambiguous action when controlling for individual differences in working memory. Results of both experiments indicated no effect of working memory load on intentionality endorsement. The implications of these results for the dual-process model of intention attribution are discussed.
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