Investigating the differential politics of competitive bidding in Ghana’s hydrocarbon and mining industries

Abstract

The rise of the transparency and accountability (T&A) agenda since the start of the twenty-first century has been identified as a key solution to the resource curse thesis. However, there remains little information available to explain the differential adoption levels of T&A-enhancing institutions across extractives. Using Ghana as a case study, this article examines the variations in the levels of adoption of competitive bidding, as an internationally promoted T&A mechanism, in the country's hydrocarbon and mining sectors. Drawing on fifty-one semi-structured interviews and secondary documents, the collected data were thematically analysed. The article finds that the rejection of competitive bidding in the mining industry was shaped by electoral imperatives, despite efforts by pro-T&A actors to push through competitive bidding. However, competitive bidding has been partially adopted in awarding licences in the hydrocarbon sector. This partial adoption is the result of the pressure exerted on the government by civil society organizations and transnational actors upon the discovery of hydrocarbons in Ghana in 2007, following suspicion of corruption in signed petroleum agreements. Consequently, the article argues that the adoption level of a T&A mechanism is shaped by electoral imperatives, albeit circumscribed by pro-T&A countervailing forces. This article contributes to supporting the work of T&A promoters by providing pointers to understand the conditions that characterize the successful adoption of T&A across extractives.