Abstract
In (Salmon, 1980) I offered a critical survey of what I regarded as the three significant theories of probabilistic causality available at that time — namely, those of I. J. Good, Hans Reichenbach, and Patrick Suppes. Both Good and Suppes have responded to that article — (Good 1980 and 1985), and (Suppes 1984, chap. 3) — and I have taken the subject up again in (Salmon 1984, chap. 7). The purpose of this paper is to continue that discussion. As I see it, we have arrived at a point at which basic intuitions about probabilistic causality clash.1 It may not be possible to resolve the conflicts, but I hope at least to clarify the issues.
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