Abstract
AbstractProvides a critical analysis and comparison of the theories of probabilistic causality offered by Hans Reichenbach I.J. Good and Patrick Suppes. Each of these theories faces some fundamental difficulties. In the end, the author argues that probabilistic causality cannot be explicated in terms of statistical relations among discrete events alone. Instead, we must take into account the physical processes that provide causal connections among events. In the time since this essay was first written, the literature on probabilistic causality has burgeoned, and the topic has become a major area of concern to many philosophers.
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