Intrusion Detection for Cybersecurity of Power Electronics Dominated Grids: Inverters PQ Set-Points Manipulation

Abstract

This work provides cybersecurity analytics for a high photovoltaic (PV) penetrated distribution network, representing future power electronics dominated grid (PEDG). Firstly, the impact of active and reactive power (PQ) set-points manipulation on the network is studied. Then, an intrusion detection system (IDS) is developed for identifying the potentially compromised PV inverters in the network. The proposed IDS is based on defining the normal, safe, and abnormal operation regions of the PV inverters from point of view of the steady state voltage stability of the network. These three-operation regions are identified by utilizing active power, reactive power, and voltage (PQV) limits of each specific grid-following inverter in the network. Each grid-following inverter’s PQV contour includes the information of network topology, inverter ratings, and inverter controller. The developed PQ limits are integrated into the centralized secondary control layer for realization of the proposed IDS. Furthermore, the proposed secondary control layer is capable of providing remedial actions during an anomaly event to enhance the grid resiliency. The theoretical analyses are verified by several attack scenarios for a network of grid-following inverters.