Introduction

Abstract

In early 1989 NATO was shaken by a dispute over replacing the Lance short-range ballistic missile with a new technically advanced missile known as Follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL) with three times the range. The acrimonious FOTL controversy, and the parallel short-range nuclear force (SNF) negotiations row, were the last in a long series of Alliance nuclear crises. These periodic debates reflected longstanding differences among the allies over the role of theatre nuclear forces (TNF) in NATO strategy; political constraints on members’ security policies; and divergent national perceptions of and reactions to the international security environment and American leadership. This last debate was no exception. It turned out to be the last great NATO nuclear debate of the Cold War. This book analyses it as the logical conclusion of those which had gone before. Because the 1980s SNF story is integrally linked to NATO’s intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) trauma, the book begins with the December 1979 INF deployment decision which set the political and military parameters within which the SNF debate unfolded. By investigating the evolution of NATO nuclear doctrine, deployments and decision-making for short-range nuclear systems in the decade 1979–1989, the book explains developments which have been either incompletely analyzed or overlooked in the tremendous attention given to the INF story.