Problems and Prospects for Negotiations on Short-Range Nuclear Forces

Abstract

Both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) have been in the process of modernizing their nuclear forces in Europe since the 1950s when American and Soviet forces were first deployed there. Parallel with these changes in the weapons stockpiles have been various proposals for arms control and for nuclear weapon-free zones; usually made by the WTO to pre-empt the latest NATO deployments. The two alliances did not field symmetrical nuclear arsenals since they were dealing with different security needs. This makes arms control very difficult unless, as was the case with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, an entire category of weapons can be eliminated and equal ceilings set at zero. This would be the preferred option of WTO, but NATO leaders consider retention of some nuclear weapons in Europe necessary to compensate for the geographical advantages of WTO. NATO used to claim that its nuclear weapons were to compensate for overwhelming superiority in WTO conventional forces, but since an agreement arising from the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) could set equal ceilings on key elements of both side’s forces, the rationale for nuclear weapons has changed. This point is repeated several times in the Comprehensive Concept Document published at the NATO summit held on 29–30 May 1989.