Introduction

Commentary

Drawing on the new DEMIG VISA database which covers global bilateral travel regulations from 1973 to 2013, this paper explores patterns and trends in international travel visa regimes. The analysis challenge the idea of a growing global mobility divide between ‘North’ and ‘South’, yielding a more complex image reflecting the multi-polar and multi-layered nature of international relations. While predominantly European and North American OECD countries have maintained relatively high levels of entry visa restrictiveness for Africa and Asia, the latter regions have the highest levels of entry restrictions themselves. While citizens of wealthy (mainly OECD) countries generally enjoy greatest visa-free travel opportunities, this primarily reflects their freedom to travel to other OECD countries. Visa-free travel is mostly realised between geographically proximate countries of integrated regional blocs such as ECOWAS, the EU, GCC and MERCOSUR. Analyses of global dynamics in visa reciprocity show that 21 per cent of the country dyads have asymmetrical visa rules, but also show that levels of reciprocity have increased since the mid-1990s. Our analysis shows that visas are not ‘just’ instruments regulating entry of visitors and exit of citizens, but are manifestations of broader political economic trends and inequalities in international power relations.

The EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 - also known as the EU-Turkey deal or the refugee deal - had strong underlying motivations both for the European Union (EU) and Turkey. For the EU, the EU-Turkey Statement aimed to limit if not, end irregular migration from Turkey and its immediate neighbourhood. For Turkey, the Statement provided financial support and strategic diplomatic engagement, putting Turkey back on the EU’s political map. With Ankara frequently threatening to withdraw from the deal and with the EU institutions responsible for the deal having been criticized for not taking a “humane” stand toward migration management and for increasing the EU’s dependence on the Turkish government, it remains somewhat unclear why the EU-Turkey Statement still perseveres. Taking into consideration both parties’ rationalist calculations, this paper offers an analytical overview of the costs and benefits of the implementation of the deal from 2016 to 2024. The findings show that the advantages of the Statement for the EU (governments) and the Turkish government outweigh its costs. Unable to engage in concerted actions and to strengthen the internal dimension of its migration governance, the Statement helped the EU utilize Turkey both as a buffer zone between countries of origin and its member states and as a geopolitical space where the refugee Other can reside. The Statement also created a blueprint for similar arrangements of the EU with other neighbouring countries. As far as Turkey is concerned, the Statement specifically equipped the Turkish government with unparalleled leverage in its relations with the EU which remains incapable of instrumentalizing its normative conditionality vis-à-vis Turkey. Thus, at the intergovernmental level, the benefits of the Statement outweigh its costs. How much this satisfactory cost-benefit ratio translates into the public domain remains unclear and is subject to further scholarly investigation. Key words: EU-Turkey relations, EU-Turkey Statement, irregular migration, refugee deal, asylum policy, transactionalism

Borders and international mobility have become dominant themes in studies on contemporary global processes, yet relatively little has been said about the various dimensions of their interaction in international relations. This chapter intends to fill the gap by exploring twin issues: the crucial political dimensions attached to international migration and, often overlooked, the serious challenge border crossings pose to the states involved. In other words, the diplomatic and symbolic dimensions of international migration affect inter-state negotiations in the international arena in multiple ways. With the shift in migration issues, such as the securitisation of European Union (EU) borders, from low to high politics as a spillover effect of the EU integration process (Huysman, 2006), it is not surprising that migration and border diplomacy in this context has become a feature of membership negotiations on EU geography. In order to review the negotiation processes and salient debates in EU-Turkey accession talks, we adopt the concept of ‘migration diplomacy’ that refers to the analysis of changing border and asylum policies as an indirect form of foreign policy (Thiollet, 2011: 13) and the notion of EU-isation or Europeanisation defined as ‘processes of construction, diffusion, and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms to a European model of governance, caused by forms of cooperation and integration in Europe’ (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004: 4).

This paper examines the role of the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the Security and Defence Partnership (SDP) as key instruments in Moldova’s European Union (EU) integration process. Amid increasing threats from Russian hybrid warfare – including cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine – Moldova faces pressing security challenges that hinder its EU accession trajectory but also act as catalysts for change. The EPF, established by a Council Decision of March 2021, provides financial and material assistance aimed at conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and the strengthening of security, with Moldova being a major beneficiary. Complementing this, the 2024 Security and Defence Partnership (SDP) formalises deeper EU–Moldova cooperation, emphasising areas such as the countering of hybrid threats, cyber issues, strategic communication, and border management, thereby enhancing Moldova’s preparedness and resilience. The author seeks to determine how these instruments support Moldova’s EU integration and the improvement of its security framework through policy transfer, institutional capacity-building, transnational socialisation, and the promotion of EU standards, contributing to Moldova’s progress in aligning with EU foreign and security policy positions. This paper underscores the importance of sustained EU support to address unresolved issues such as corruption and the presence of Russian troops in Transnistria, which pose diplomatic and strategic dilemmas. Furthermore, it explores how these EU instruments facilitate Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis in external relations (Chapter 30) and common foreign and security policy (Chapter 31), fostering institutional reforms necessary for integration. Overall, the author argues that the EPF and the SDP not only enhance Moldova’s security but also support its EU accession process, in the context of an evolving geopolitical landscape characterised by Russia’s assertiveness and the strategic importance of Moldova’s stability for the EU.

Essays on the political economy of European integration

For over thirty years, Turkey has sought membership in what is today called the European Union (EU). This article argues that the most likely scenario to reach that goal is that Ankara will speed up its efforts to meet the EU's membership criteria, and that the EU will begin accession talks and later admit Turkey as a member in a reasonable time period. There are two main reasons for this. The first is that Turkey's determination to meet the accession criteria has increased in the post-g/n era. Today, a growing number of Turkish people concur that meeting the accession criteria, let alone acquiring full membership, will serve Turkey's interests. This is especially true when security considerations are taken into account. The second reason is that the EU itself has started to change its attitude toward Turkey's membership application. An increasing number of EU citizens now believe that the membership of a gradually Europeanizing Turkey will be in the EU's interests, mainly defined in terms of security and identity considerations.HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKEY'S VIEW OF THE EU UNTIL THE LATE 1990SThirty years after the signing of the association agreement, Turkey-EU relations have undergone radical change. Since 1996, Turkey has been in a eustoms union agreement with the EU and, since late 1999, Turkey has been a membership candidate with full membership ostensibly dependent upon its meeting a set of criteria (i.e., the Copenhagen criteria) that has been applied to all other recent aspirant countries. Since 1999 and following the announcement of Turkey's candidacy, there have been radical developments in EU-Turkey relations. With the accession partnership document and Turkey's national program, Ankara is today closer to the EU than ever before. Turkey and the EU finally solved their dispute over the European security and defence policy (ESDP) in 2002, and the decision adopted at the Copenhagen summit in December 2002 for the first time overtly stated that accession talks with Turkey should start without further delay, provided that the European Commission report of late 2004 recommended this. In the November 2002 elections, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Ankara, and because of the party's prevailing pro-EU inclinations the pace of reform has also increased, not only in the domestic sphere but also in Turkey's foreign policy practices. Lastly, at the December 2004 Brussels summit, the European Union agreed to start the accession talks with Turkey in October 2005 pending Turkey's prior approval of extending the customs union agreement to the recently admitted 10 EU members, including the Republic of Cyprus.However promising such developments might appear for achieving Ankara's long-held goal of EU membership, problems remain. First, Turkey's approach towards the EU has traditionally rested on ideological grounds, rather than on a rational cost-benefit analysis. Turkey has long argued that it should be admitted to the union due to its European character. At the same time, the majority of the Turkish elites have believed that to solidify Turkey's European/western/modern identity, EU membership is a must. The problem with such an approach has been that Turkish policymakers have long failed to understand why the EU members hesitated to offer a clear membership prospect to Turkey based on their own cost-benefit calculations.1 Turkish elites have tended to believe that just as Turkey wants to join the EU on identity related grounds, the EU also adopts the same rationale vis-a-vis Turkey. Rather than believing that the EU's reluctance might emanate from its own cost-benefit calculations with respect to Turkey's admission, Ankara has long believed that the EU does not want Turkey mainly because it sees Turkey as non-European.Second, the majority of the Turkish elites have long thought that Turkey has the right to join the EU, as article 28 of the 1964 Association treaty vaguely mentions this possibility. …

Using Voting Advice Application (VAA) data from the EU Profiler/euandi Trend File, we studied how parties’ positions towards European integration relate to their positions on other important issues, and how this varies across EP elections, and between European regions. We hypothesized that the association between parties’ EU-integration positions and their positions on other issues was affected by the three major crises that hit the European Union (EU) between 2009 and 2019: the economic, migration, and climate crises. Additionally, we hypothesized that the economic and migration crises asymmetrically affected the association between cultural and economic issues on the one hand and the EU dimension on the other across the EU’s three macro regions (NWE, SE, and CEE). Our results show that neither the economic crisis nor the migration crisis or the climate crisis had an EU-wide impact on how European integration relates to other issue dimensions. As we hypothesized, economic issues were particularly strongly linked to EU-integration positions in SE in 2014, but our results additionally indicated that the longstanding interpretation of EU integration as a mainly economic issue in SE diminished after the start of the migration crisis. Finally, EU integration became related to immigration issues in CEE while this is not the case in the other regions. The main takeaway is that EU integration is interpreted differently by parties across the EU, which is important to recognize for parties that seek to work together in transnational party groups, and for scholars that aim to understand EU policy making.

As Ukraine progresses toward European Union (EU) integration, the transformation of its legal education system has become a pivotal aspect of its alignment with EU standards. The training of legal professionals capable of navigating both Ukrainian and EU legal systems is essential to the implementation of directives, fostering cross-border cooperation, and maintaining the rule of law. However, this process faces challenges including the legacy of Ukraine's post-Soviet legal education, resource constraints, and the need for rapid modernization. By adopting international best practices, fostering partnerships, and integrating modern technologies, Ukraine has the opportunity to create a legal education framework that meets EU demands and empowers its lawyers to thrive in global contexts. This article aims to analyze the challenges and opportunities in training lawyers for Ukraine’s European future. It seeks to compare Ukraine’s legal education practices with those in EU countries, identify critical gaps, and propose actionable reforms to align Ukraine’s legal training systems with EU standards. A comparative analysis methodology is employed, drawing insights from literature, policy documents, and case studies of EU member states and transitioning nations. The study systematically examines disparities in curriculum content, teaching methods, practical skill development, faculty expertise, resource access, ethical training, and employment market alignment. Both qualitative and quantitative data inform the recommendations for reform. The analysis reveals significant disparities between Ukraine and EU countries in legal education systems. Key findings include Ukraine’s reliance on outdated curricula, limited practical training opportunities, inadequate faculty development, and fragmented ethical training. Conversely, EU countries emphasize dynamic, interdisciplinary curricula, robust practical skill development, and integrated ethical considerations, supported by advanced resources and technology. Despite these challenges, Ukraine's EU integration provides a unique opportunity to modernize its legal education system through international collaboration, leveraging technology, and implementing market-aligned reforms. Future studies should explore the long-term impact of implemented reforms on Ukraine’s legal system and investigate strategies for sustaining educational alignment with rapidly evolving EU standards.

The protection of human rights in the European Union (EU) has been developing steadily. The EU has its own catalogue of fundamental rights, the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU. Human rights in the EU are guaranteed by EU law and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). Now, coherence between internal and external relations regarding human rights is required. The Treaty of Lisbon provides a mechanism for achieving this coherence. That is, the Treaty of Lisbon enables the EU to mainstream human rights in the EU’s external relations. On the one hand, the Treaty of Lisbon provides the EU’s values in Article 2 TEU, and its political principles in Article 21 TEU and Article 3 TEU. On the other hand, the Treaty of Lisbon confers new competences to the EU. Furthermore, the combination of the former and the latter enables the Union to conclude not only international agreements, including human rights, but also international human rights agreements. Furthermore, Article 21 TEU can be used as a means for cross-fertilisation in the context of the protection of human rights.

Battered by Geopolitical Winds, Bulgaria Struggles to Restart Much Needed Reforms

This article delves into the intricate relationship between contested state- hood and European Union (EU) integration, explicitly focusing on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Since the early 1990s, amidst the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the EU’s enlargement efforts, BiH has grappled with challenges to its statehood, which have impeded its alignment with EU requirements. Despite being universally recognised as an independent state, BiH faces internal contestation, evident in its consociational constitutional framework and the divergent nationalist narratives among constituent groups. Moreover, while BiH maintains external sovereignty, it coexists with significant international oversight, complicating its path toward EU integration. The EU’s expansion into internally contested states like BiH necessitates a nuanced approach considering the entanglement of Europeanisation and de-Daytonisation processes. This article emphasises the complexity of BiH’s governance landscape, where internal dynamics and external influences converge, creating formidable obstacles to sovereignty assertion and governance efficacy. To surmount these challenges, BiH must address internal divisions, foster inclusive governance mechanisms and balance external supervision and internal autonomy. In shedding light on how contested statehood influences the EU’s role and policies, the article discusses the concept of ‘complex sovereignty’, particularly relevant to BiH’s context.

EU-ERWEITERUNG IN KRISENZEITEN? ZUR BEITRITTSREIFE DER BEITRITTSKANDIDATEN VOM WESTBALKAN (EU Enlargement in Times of Crisis? Readiness for Accession of the Western Balkan Candidate Countries)

Approximately one million people used the Mediterranean Sea routes to reach the European Union (EU) and seek asylum in 2015. The vast majority of these people used the eastern Mediterranean route from Turkey to EU member state, Greece. They continued along the Western Balkans route to re-enter the EU, either through the Republic of Croatia (Croatia) or Hungary. In March 2016, the Western Balkans route was declared closed by EU representatives. These border closures coincided with the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. Agreements between the EU, Turkey, and the countries of the Western Balkans ended the influx of people seeking asylum in the EU. More people lost their lives trying to reach the EU to seek asylum in 2016 than in 2015 using alternative routes to the eastern Mediterranean route, such as the central Mediterranean route, and there are increasingly more people seeking asylum being detained in Turkey and Greece. In addition, as of May 2019, there were just under 4000 people waiting in limbo in the Republic of Serbia, most of whom were in the recently opened ‘migrant reception and transit centres,’ while over 500 people are estimated to be camping close to borders with Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina or Hungary. My hypothesis is that by strengthening the EU’s external borders for people seeking asylum, the EU has attempted to restrict access to asylum and the arrival of people in need of international protection in Europe. The ‘saving lives’ rhetoric, which is the purported aim of policies such as the EU-Turkey Statement, does not appear to capture fully the motivations of EU actors or acknowledge the impacts of EU actions on people seeking asylum. It is important to delve deeper into the consequences of the EU and individual member state responses to the 2015 influx of people seeking asylum in order to (i) analyse for whom these measures ensure security, (ii) determine why they have been implemented, and (iii) describe how these measures impact on the right to asylum. This thesis employs the theoretical framework of securitisation to analyse the reasons behind the closure of the Western Balkans route and the EU-Turkey Statement in order to identify the dominant security paradigm and how securitisation impacts access to asylum in Europe. The consequences of the EU-Turkey Statement and the closure of the Western Balkans route suggest that providing protection for people seeking asylum is not imperative in the EU and reinforces the narrative of only EU citizens deserving freedom and security from the perceived ‘threat’ of unmanaged migration. To test my hypothesis that the ‘saving lives’ rhetoric is misleading, I collected empirical data in the form of interviews from government officials along the Western Balkans route, Greece and Hungary, as well as non-governmental organisations, and intergovernmental organisations. In addition to empirical research, I conducted a doctrinal analysis of EU regulatory frameworks and provide a background analysis of EU law concerning matters of migration and asylum and its increasingly restrictive tendencies, as well as that of the countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey. I used triangulation to validate my findings. This thesis presents how European governments fuelled the 2015 ‘migration crisis’ with their mismanagement and reluctance to work together to resettle and relocate people from Turkey and out of Europe’s ‘hot spots.’ Empirical data shows that people seeking asylum are not perceived by the interviewees of this research as a real(ist) existential threat, but that their presence has been constructed as ‘burdening’ and threatening in other ways, such as to the labour market, social services and religious and cultural makeup of European society. The ‘crisis’ and threat of undocumented migration was used for electoral benefits and to reinforce the power and control of EU governments, institutions and agencies. The year 2015 brought the plight of millions of people displaced around the world to Europe’s doorstep. In order to ‘save lives,’ European governments, institutions and agencies mobilised to secure the borders to prevent people from drowning at sea. Stronger border security, however, has resulted in adverse consequences: an increase in smuggling, more dangerous alternative pathways, and has externalised the EU border, restricting access to asylum on European territory. While tragic, the majority of interviewees viewed the influx as a ‘crisis’ and ‘threat’ predominantly in terms of the numbers and irregularity (transit) – and not in the number of lives lost. Measures implemented in 2016 as a result of the 2015 influx privilege the security of EU citizens over those in need of international protection.

Over the past two decades, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) European Union (EU) integration process has garnered significant scholarly attention in the context of Western Balkans studies. This article contributes to this discourse by employing a descriptive analysis approach to examine thirty-one key legal documents issued between 1992 and 2022 by the BiH Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Ministers, and Presidency. These documents serve as primary sources, offering crucial insights into BiH’s legal framework governing its EU integration efforts. Through rigorous textual analysis, this article evaluates the efficacy of these documents in facilitating the necessary reforms for EU accession. The findings reveal a significant discrepancy between the rhetoric of reform in governmental papers and the actual implementation of these reforms in BiH’s political landscape. This highlights systemic challenges within BiH’s governance that hinder effective reform implementation and EU accession progress. By critically analyzing these legal documents, this article provides a nuanced understanding of BiH’s EU integration trajectory, emphasizing the gap between policy formulation and implementation. It argues that mere rhetorical commitments in governmental documents are insufficient to drive meaningful reform in BiH and achieve EU membership.