Introduction: Stevens and Germany, Stevens in (West) Germany

The extent of American influence on postwar German affairs is arguably unprecedented in history of relations between modern nation-states. From preeminent occupying force after World War II to guardian, cultural exporter, and largest trading and investment partner, United States played a role in postwar (West) German society that has led chroniclers of German affairs to speak of United States as the midwife of German democracy and to describe Federal Republic as Americanized. The still-proliferating literature on German-American relations takes as premise a decisive American presence in German society; instances range from presumed surrender to American policies and culture to what some characterize as troublesome rise of anti-Americanism. The United States, as largest political and economic power and dominant cultural trendsetter, has often represented indeed, symbolized the for post-World War II Germans. Ever since founding of two separate Germanies in 1949, German Democratic Republic (East Germany), and Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), West Germans have been acutely aware some might argue, proud -of belonging to the West, a concept that was initially identified almost exclusively with United States, and only later in postwar era with Western Europe. It was not without historical irony that East Germans, soon after Berlin Wall was opened in November 1989, were greeted in West Berlin by a huge billboard advertising American-made West cigarettes with slogan Test West. 1 Given this context, how do Germans learn about United States, and, more specifically, how does German-language portrayal of United States history compare with historical literature that has materialized in America?2 The short answer is: not very favorably. There is very little evidence of different or uniquely German perspectives that might shed new and revealing light on American past. Above all, immense richness of sources and diversity in approaches that

Reviewed by: Trams or Tailfins? Public and Private Prosperity in Postwar West Germany and the United States by Jan L. Logemann Els De Vos (bio) Trams or Tailfins? Public and Private Prosperity in Postwar West Germany and the United States. By Jan L. Logemann. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012, Pp. xvi+300. $45. European postwar consumer societies often are depicted as places where the “Americanization” of consumption has taken place, with American types of mass-scale consumption replacing a more bourgeois mode. Recently, however, that generalization has been challenged. For example, in the framework of the European Science Foundation–funded project European Ways of Life in the American Century: Mediating Consumption and Technology in the Twentieth Century, several (mainly European) researchers question the extent to which the European postwar modes of consumption and material cultures were “Americanized.” In the project’s just-published synthesizing book, they shed light on processes of transforming, ignoring, or resisting American influences that took place in various countries (see Per Lundin and Thomas Kaiserfeld, eds., The Making of European Consumption). Jan L. Logemann’s Trams or Tailfins fits this new approach. Logemann, a research fellow at the German Historical Institute in Washington, D.C., compares the postwar American consumer society with the West German one. While the suburban house, supermarket, fully equipped kitchen, and individual’s car were dominating the American consumer landscape, West German consumers preferred urban living, trams, and the local grocery store within walking distance. Logemann looks for explanations in the following areas: public policy, social norms, and the geographical environment. As a result, the book is divided into three parts. The first maps the public policy attitudes toward public and private consumption in West Germany and the United States. The higher level of private spending in the United States can be attributed to the higher purchasing power of Americans, less state intervention in the free market, and less public spending. This last point is very interesting, as consumption history has focused mainly on private consumption, with public consumption remaining out of sight. Nevertheless, the investments in areas such as public transport and social provisions were crucial in the formation of the European welfare states. They cultivated an urban culture. [End Page 283] The second part focuses on consumer aspirations and the social meaning of consumption. Logemann argues that American citizens bought more durable goods because they saw doing so as a way to increase their social status, while in West Germany, social stratification dominated consumption patterns. That might be mistaking cause for effect, however: as incomes increased in the United States, possession of certain material goods became a measure of social status. In this vein, Logemann notes that the easy accessibility of mortgage loans accelerated private U.S. consumption. The last part discusses how consumption reconfigured space, while space reinforced certain consumption patterns. In the United States, large-scale suburbanization took place, which encouraged (and depended on) car ownership to reach the workplace. Car use was a catalyst for supermarkets situated near big roads and surrounded by large parking lots. The long distance to the city center led people to invest more in leisure activities at home, which contributed to the disinvestment in public provisions such as the theater, cinema, or public transport. Logemann convincingly outlines the developments of the consumer societies in the two countries. Instead of the Americanization of West Germany, he shows how the country took lessons from the developments in the United States. The West Germans did not blindly adore the U.S. system; its policymakers worked to maintain lively and compact cities with small shops. West German consumers remained critical toward American products. They preferred sound, durable goods instead of fancy objects. Certain “American” evolutions were present in Germany, such as suburbanization, the rise of car ownership, and the emergence of supermarkets. However, these were guided and regulated much more in favor of public interests. The case of West Germany illustrates how the “soft power” of the United States was quite successfully resisted and transformed in Europe. Despite his interest in the role of public policy, Logemann pays little attention to a set of influential actors. In Europe, many organizations and institutions, including state agencies...

Implicit social cognition refers to attitudes and stereotypes that may reside outside conscious awareness and control but that still affect human behavior. In particular, the implicit favoritism of an ingroup, to which an individual belongs, as opposed to an outgroup, to which the individual does not belong, characterized as ingroup bias, is of interest and is investigated here. We used a Go/NoGo association task (GNAT) and behavioral and electroencephalographic (event-related EEG potential [ERP] analysis) measures to investigate the implicit bias toward cities in East Germany, West Germany, and Europe, in 16 individuals each from West and East Germany (mixed gender, M age = 24). The GNAT assesses an individual's Go and NoGo responses for a given association between a target category and either pole (positive or negative) of an evaluative dimension. Behavioral measures revealed slightly faster reaction times to the combination of European city names and negative, as compared with positive, evaluative words in both groups. ERP analysis showed an increased negativity at 400-800 ms poststimulus in the incongruent conditions of East German city/positive word pairings (in West Germans) and West German city/positive word pairings (in East Germans). An implicitly moderately negative evaluation of Europe by both groups was exhibited based on the behavioral data, and an increased level of conflict arising from the "incongruent" pairings (ie, as manifestation of an implicitly negative attitude toward East Germany in West Germans, and toward West Germany in East Germans) was exhibited based on the electrophysiological data.

Correspondence: The Profitability of Primacy

the desPeration to enshroud conFessional Poetry in neGativity is remarkable. in its heyday critics called it narcissistic and irrelevant; in the twenty-first century it is labeled passe. According to Alan Williamson, almost from the moment that unfortunate term was coined, confessionalism has been the whipping boy of half a dozen newer schools (51). the legal and religious connotations of confession-sinful, brash, illicit, begging for censure-may be in part to blame. it is also true that the biographical nature of confessional and its engagement with taboo topics such as mental illness, sexuality, mortality, and the subconscious means the poet's life can overshadow the work. some claim that getting mileage out of personal experience is akin to whoredom. others maintain that neuroticism drives confessional poets to foist their suffering upon readers in order to self-satisfy. those eager to vilify confessionalism readily accept the confessional poet as both prostitute and the recipient of the orgasm. Melissa A. Goldthwaite relates the difficulties of teaching plath: said, 'Craft, craft, craft. Look at these line breaks, her use of sound and form.' i pointed to images and allusions. Always, plath's reputation preceded her. students asked: 'didn't she kill herself? How? Are her kids screwed up?' (72). this is how of the greatest poets of the twentieth century has been remembered. sylvia plath is the most famous confessional poet and was a student of Robert Lowell, whose Life Studies in 1959 initiated the genre. Robert phillips describes confessionalism as belonging to the 1960s post-Christian, post-Kennedy, post-pill America (13). While this description may aptly situate plath, her recurring World War ii imagery suggests confessionalism should also be considered postHolocaust and post-bomb-and those identifiers cement confessional poetry's continued international significance.Australian confessional poet Bruce Beaver wrote his first poem at age seventeen as a response to the bombing of Hiroshima. this also marked the onset of his manic-depressive illness. Beaver's work had a considerable inf luence on the development of the Generation of 1968 and the new Australian poetry of the 1970s, but in an interview with thomas shapcott, Beaver said, would rather be a minor world poet than a big Australian poet, and his wish came true. on his death, fellow poet dorothy porter called him one of Australia's least known great poets, describing him as follows:Beaver beat the American Confessional poets at their own game, while revealing the pit of madness under the dozy complacency of Australian society and its [. . .] despite his aura of numinous erudition he is just a middle-aged man who suffers from spring rheumatism [. . .] Beaver loved the idea of the psychopomp [. . .] sometimes he is Hermes, strolling you in and out of private landscapes glowing with unearthly energy. other times he is Charon ferrying you to the underworld.Clear connections can be made between Beaver and plath. Both were highly influential poets. Both center their in post-Holocaust existence, in Greek mythology, and in Jungian notions of the collective unconscious. Both have their craft overshadowed by their biographies and the experiences of mental illness that informed their writing. Both poets are neglected because of the unsettled feeling their causes in the pits of our stomachs.the scope of confessional is mythically mapped by the journey of orpheus. the confessional poet engages us with lyric address, the voice lulling us. We are immersed in the trauma of the poet's personal experience and confront the often-concealed ills that affect humankind. We seek answers and are drawn into the psychological underworld to face our own demons. the poet encodes symbols, which must be understood through biographical, literary, and historical reference, and listened for like footfalls so that we may heal and return to the surface. …

Until now mortality trends of melanoma and nonmelanoma skin cancer (NMSC) in Germany have been studied only in West Germany. We were interested in comparing mortality trends of melanoma and NMSC in West and East Germany before and after the post-communist transition. By analyses of health care utilization data in West and East Germany, we explored potential reasons for mortality differences between these regions. We analyzed mortality data of skin melanoma and NMSC of West and East Germany (1980-2005). We calculated sex-specific age-standardized mortality rates using the World Standard Population. We calculated age-specific mortality rates (20-39, 40-59, 60-79, 80+ years). Age-standardized skin melanoma mortality rates tended to be lower in East Germany than West Germany before reunification. After reunification rates became very similar. Age-standardized mortality rates of NMSC were continuously higher in East than West Germany. The mortality rate differences among East and West Germans in 1996-2005 are mainly due to 2.34- and 2.24-fold higher mortality rates among men and women aged 80 years, respectively, who live in East Germany. Even 15 years after reunification, mortality of NMSC is still higher in East than West Germany, although incidence rates of squamous cell cancers of the skin are not higher in East Germany. Differences in the participation in early cancer detection and health care utilization in West and East Germany do not sufficiently explain our findings.

Lessons of the Cold War

Infections may play a role in the etiology of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS), with Bordetella pertussis being a potential agent. The objective was to analyze the association of SIDS and infant pertussis hospitalization rates over time, comparing a previously unvaccinated population (West Germany) versus a predominantly vaccinated population (East Germany). We calculated SIDS rates per 1000 live births per state. Live births and SIDS were available from 1980 onwards for the West German states and from 1991 onwards for the East German states. We applied interrupted time series (ITS) analyses to investigate the role of two public health interventions in 1991 (West Germany) and in 2000 (West and East Germany), respectively. Infant pertussis hospitalizations were available for five West German and three East German states between 1994 and 2019. We used multilayer and multivariate correlation analyses to determine the correlation between SIDS and pertussis hospitalization rates, including Pearson correlation test and vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis. In West Germany, the average annual SIDS rate (per 1000 live births) increased from 1.08 in 1980 to 1.68 in 1991, before declining to 1.18 in 1992 and subsequently to 0.10 in 2020. In East Germany, the average annual SIDS rate (per 1000 live births) decreased from 0.79 in 1991 to 0.12 in 2020. The results of the ITS model indicated a significant change in both level and slope at the 1991 interventions (West Germany) and in slope at the 2000 interventions (West and East Germany). The correlation coefficients between SIDS and infant pertussis hospitalization rates were 0.69 (95% CI [confidence interval]0.41, 0.85; p < 0.001) in West Germany, and 0.41 (95% CI 0.03, 0.69; p = 0.037) in East Germany. The correlation decreased during later periods (2000-2019, 2010-2019), particularly in East Germany. The results of the VAR analysis corroborated the findings of the main analyses. SIDS and infant pertussis hospitalization rates were correlated in both West and East Germany. Further studies - including improved diagnostic assessment of pertussis - seem warranted. Not applicable.

Enzensberger’s Illusions

Reviewed by: Die hellen Jahre über dem Atlantik. Leben zwischen Deutschland und Amerika by Frank Trommler Stephen Brockmann Die hellen Jahre über dem Atlantik. Leben zwischen Deutschland und Amerika. By Frank Trommler. Vienna: Böhlau, 2022. Pp. 384. Hardcover €28.00. ISBN 978-3412525422. Frank Trommler’s beautifully illustrated tome is both an autobiography and a personal history of German studies in the United States over the course of the last six decades. As someone who served as president of the GSA at the moment of German reunification, who organized the humanities program of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies in Washington, D.C., from the early 1990s into the twenty-first century, and who played a central role in planning the academic commemoration of the three-hundredth anniversary of German immigration to North America in 1983, Trommler is uniquely placed to offer insights into the ways that the field has changed. These changes are both positive and negative. When Trommler arrived in the United States from West Germany in the 1960s, “German studies” did not exist, and the most influential practitioners of Germanistik, defined primarily as the study of canonical German-language literature, formed an “old boys network” that came together every year in December for the MLA convention. That “old boys network” was, to a large extent, dominated by white, male, German-speaking immigrants from Central Europe, many of whom had fled from the predations of the Nazi dictatorship. During his first decades in the United States, Trommler witnessed the final flowering of that approach to Germanistik. At the same time, over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, he fought for and helped to ensure the breakthrough of a more comprehensive, historically and politically oriented approach to the German-speaking world, one that brought historians together with literary scholars. Their most important institutional foundation was the GSA, a product of the 1970s that was originally called the Western Association for German Studies (WAGS) before its name changed to the current one in 1983. The transformation in the field also brought with it increasing diversification, as more and more women began to take on leading roles, feminist scholarship grew and flourished, and the definition of “German” was broadened to include more than just traditional ethnic Germans but also multiculturalism, hybridity, migration, etc. The field also became increasingly “Americanized,” i.e., less dominated by Germanistik [End Page 340] as practiced in Germany and Austria and more focused on its position within the US academy and in dialog with American colleagues in other disciplines such as English and history. Paradoxically, this “Americanization” of German studies was also championed by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), which had a keen interest in preserving the relevance of Germany and German culture for an American audience. All of those developments were always threatened by the fundamental fact that Germany is a long way away from the United States, and that the humanities generally, as well as foreign languages and cultures, including German, are relatively marginal. Even within the MLA, the English language and British, American, and Canadian literature dominate. During the Cold War, German and other foreign language fields profited from a Cold War bonus, and even after German reunification, the field of German profited temporarily from renewed interest among American college students. However, in the long run, the end of the Cold War led to declining interest in European languages and cultures, including German. The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, only exacerbated this problem, and Trommler notes the way that US and European attitudes differed radically in the wake of that event: “The Americans are from Mars, the Europeans from Venus” (335–336, a reference to a book by Robert Kagan published shortly after 9/11). As a result of all these developments, as well as others, American interest in central Europe generally, and in German-speaking culture specifically, radically declined after 9/11, and it has continued to decline. Therefore, although the field of German studies has become more diversified and open, it has also become less central to US intellectual life, even within an academic setting. The field has been diversified but also, at the very same time...

One Foot Out of the Plastic Cage:The Un-Americanization of West German Consumer Society David Steigerwald (bio) Jan L. Logemann. Trams or Tailfins? Public and Private Prosperity in Postwar West Germany and the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. vii + 300 pp. Figures, tables, abbreviations, notes, and index. $45.00. For about a week in Summer 2011, my favorite restaurant became the Lidenbrau at Potsdamer Platz. Partly, this was because I did not know Berlin well, and the prominent location is easy to find. Though I had never been there, the place looked familiar. Helmut Jahn’s SONY building famously lords over the site, Mt. Fuji–like; but given contemporary architects’ apparent conviction that no amount of glass is too much, one could be forgiven for thinking of Jahn’s buildings in Philadelphia or Chicago. The clearest proof that we weren’t in Kansas City was the waiter’s response when my companion asked for tap water: He shook his head in stern disapproval and delivered an emphatic “NO!” Today’s Potsdamer Platz is an international architectural showcase. After the Wall came down, the junction became the world’s largest single construction site and gave work to an array of world-renowned architects, including Jahn, Renzo Piano, Arata Isozaki, and Richard Rogers. They brought with them the latest in building fashion, if not a rich knowledge of, or respect for, the city’s past. For many Berliners, the plaza’s pell-mell reconstruction symbolized not so much German redemption as the post–Cold War triumph of global capitalism at virtually the precise geographical flash point of three-quarters of a century of profound human conflict. Destroyed in the war, left desolate in No Man’s Land after 1961, Potsdamer Platz was mostly a weed-strewn wasteland in the early 1990s. Then the city invited multinationals like SONY to scoop up huge tracts of prime real estate for their vanity buildings, and the architects imposed their visions without much reference to Berlin’s notable architectural past. City officials and locals alike bemoaned the “Manhattanization” of a space that has played a key role in their city since Frederick the Great turned it into the main point of royal entry into the capital from Sanssouci. Surely this was a better resolution than bombs and guard posts, but it was bound to leave anyone who cared about the German-ness of the city ambivalent at best. [End Page 132] It is tricky business negotiating between the homogenizing pressures of global capital and particular social and cultural forms, and the most important contribution that Jan L. Logemann makes in Trams or Tailfins? is his largely convincing explanation for how a distinct value system can shape and control consumer capitalism in ways that honor, rather than obliterate, that distinctiveness. In arguing that West Germany was not “Americanized” after the war, Logemann joins a long debate about American consumer capitalism’s power, sweep, and depth of influence in the developed world through the second half of the twentieth century. In pointed contrast to Reinhold Wagnleitner’s Coca-colonization and the Cold War (1994) and Victoria de Grazia’s Irresistible Empire (2005), Logemann argues that, for all the noisy commentary, pro and con, about postwar Americanization, West Germans shaped their version of the affluent society according to deeply held and distinctly un-American values. Rather than a sweeping homogenization of the developed world, postwar affluence ran along “different paths to consumer modernity” (p. 2). Logemann’s book is a closely reasoned “structural comparison” (p. 2) of the competing manners by which the United States and West Germany moved through the postwar Age of Affluence. He argues that, during the postwar “miracle years,” West Germans molded a regime of consumption based on the ideal of “social citizenship” and insisted on a privileged place for public goods over merely private ones. Instead of the “consumer-as-citizen” (whom Lizabeth Cohen, in The Consumer’s Republic [2003], defined as the main social type in postwar America), West Germans promoted the social consumer who practiced “public consumption,” which Logemann defines as “the provision of publicly funded alternatives to private consumer goods and services in areas ranging from housing...

<i>Building a European Identity: France, the United States, and the Oil Shock, 1973–1974</i>

The mental-cultural situation of the re-united GermanyIn 1993 an exhibition presenting phenomena about the past, present and future of both East and West Germany took place in Berlin. It became clear that West and East Germans differ in inter alia the way in which life and existence have been experienced. East and West Germans also have different perspectives and perceptions of policy and society. Among the former GDR-citizens, nostalgia dominates the reflection on the past. It should, however, not be underestimated how deeply East and West Germans have been alienated from each other and that many East Germans think that facing a common future - together with West Germans - is more than they could handle. The difference in which life and existence have been experienced in East and West Germany is also reflected in German literature as is pointed out in the work of Ulrich Woelk. It also becomes, however, clear that the idea of a common German culture and history supplies a strong link to overcome these alienations.

M ost nations, particularly those of Europe, can no longer afford the luxury of strictly national programs of research in the physical sciences. West Germany provides a stark reminder of this in a new review of its astronomy program. Although it proposes a large new optical telescope and radiotelescope as national projects, the report of that review, Denkschrift Astronomie, indicates the degree of West German dependence on international collaboration in the practice of astronomy According to the report, published recently (in German) by the German research organization Deutsche Forschungsgemeinshaft, present situation [in astronomy] is distinguished by a structural development that has led, as also in physics, to ever-larger national and 'supernational' [research] centers. Internationalization in science seems to depend on what a country can afford and where its priorities are. The U.S. government has resisted internationalizing the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC), even though foreign governments urged it. When New York and Quebec Province tried to internationalize the SSC by the back door, proposing a site that crosses the border between them, the U.S. Department of Energy threw out the proposal at first look. On the other hand, the Department of Energy is now proposing the internationalization of the magnetic fusion research program, which aims to make thermonuclear fusion a source of electric power. Magnetic fusion has suffered severe budget constraints in recent years, and many of its proponents have come to believe it is a poorly regarded stepchild of the government's overall program. Internationalizing it may be the only way to keep some kind of program going. Back in the days when internationalism in science was largely a matter of communication and occasional movements of personnel, Germany had important national programs in all the natural sciences. Much publishing was in the German language, and schools in other countries gave special courses in scientific German. The Nazi era ruined much of that. Persecution drove prominent scientists out of the country, and the war destroyed a great deal of equipment. Recovery took a long time. Indeed, according to Denkschrift Astronomie, the last previous review of West German astronomy took place in 1962, at a time when German astronomers felt they had just about finished repairingwhat could be repaired of the damage done by the Third Reich. Since 1962, as Denkschrift Astronomie points out, astronomy has become a wider science. In 1962 radioastronomy had already developed alongside optical astronomy, but X-ray astronomy hardly existed, and such exotica as gamma-ray astronomy and neutrino astronomy were hopes or promises rather than science. All these fields have developed extensively since then, and several of them are largely dependent on space travel, a technology which then had also hardly begun. Parallel to observational and technological extensions, a change has come in what might be called the spirit of astronomy. Physics has increasingly pervaded astronomy, and the science is now much more a branch of physics than it used to be. Astronomers now often like to be called astrophysicists. It is no longer enough to know how the heavens go, as Galileo is supposed to have defined the goal of astronomy; astronomers want to know what makes the heavensgo the way they do. The connection to physics tends to be strongest in the newer realms of astronomy, particularly X-ray and gamma-ray astronomy. Because these observations have to be done above the interference of the atmosphere, they are also the domain where astronomy depends most heavily on spaceflight technology Spacefaring started out as a nationalistic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Ironically, in this realm the West German program is entirely dependent on international cooperation. DenkschriftAstronomie envisions German programs in cooperation with the European Space Agency, in which West Germany is a partner, and also with the American NASA and the Soviet space agency For X-ray and extreme-ultraviolet astronomy, the two ROSATs (short for Roentgensatellit) will be largely German projects flown by NASA. ROSAT, which is scheduled to fly in 1990, will be the first all-sky survey in the energy range between 0.01 and 2 kilo-electron-volts. ROSAT-2/SPECTROSAT (launch 1992 or 1993) will carry a spectrograph to study the X-ray emission lines (cyclotron-resonance lines) found in the spectra of magnetic neutron stars. The West German astronomers also envision participation in several more major space projects of the next couple of decades. For infrared, the West Germans expect to provide 15 to 25 percent of the cost of NASA's planned Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA), an aircraft that will carry a 3meter telescope for observations while flying. This will be a preparation for a European Space Agency project intended for about the turn of the century, called FIRST (Far Infrared Space Telescope). In radioastronomy, the preferred method of observation today is interferometry, combining signals received at widely separated telescopes to gain resolution of details that a single telescope could not distinguish. Very-long-baseline interferometry (VLBI), which has used antennas continents and oceans apart, is now poised to go into space and combine observations by ground-based and space-based telescopes. The Soviet Union plans to launch a satellite called RADIOASTRON for VLBI in 1992, and the report proposes German participation in the network that goes with it. There is still plenty of ground-based VLBI to do, however, particularly in the

In the 1950s, West German and U.S. society reacted to the ambiguity of gender roles during the Second World War and the immediate postwar period by returning to patriarchal modes of behavior and enforcing rigid, traditional gender roles. While National Socialism had promoted a model of “comradeship” between women and men, a special problem arose at the end of the war. As Lutz Niethammer put it, “As . . . the male comrades returned, the substantial 'normalization' project that in retrospect seems rather embarrassing posed this problem: How could Kameradschaft be reconciled with traditional gender roles?” Women's temporary “emancipation” in the United States had resulted from the exigencies of the war, but it had no place in the “American way of life” of the 1950s. Opposition to this emancipation began immediately at war's end, when it was denounced as both morally suspect and socially deviant. The Cold War between the superpowers found a parallel on the homefront, with domestic containment corresponding to inter-national containment. Security and order became high priorities at home in a world made insecure by the threat of nuclear war and the formation of two adversarial blocs. In West Germany, the cult of domesticity promoted integration of the men returning home from war into society and the economy, and created distance from the “forced emancipation” of women in the other half of Germany.