Introduction: constitutional pluralism as inequality and the asymmetry of the EMU

Abstract

This book brings together two central themes in European constitutionalism: the euro crisis and constitutional pluralism. While the first has been one of the main substantive discussions within European constitutionalism during the previous decade, constitutional pluralism has been the main theoretical discussion. This chapter introduces these two themes and spells out the research questions and arguments of this book. The primary interest of this study is focused on the interaction between national courts and the European Court of Justice. It is argued that differences in the Member States’ constitutions result in the unequal possibility of national courts to interact with the European Union’s constitutional order. This is called the inequality thesis. This interaction is studied in the context of the euro crisis. The secondary interest of this study is focused on the asymmetrical structure of the Economic and Monetary Union and the consequences such asymmetry has for European constitutionalism. The link between these two themes is how a functioning single currency without a common economic policy seems to require transferring decision-making to the supranational level, which the national courts seem to have contested in their crisis-related rulings.