Conclusion: equality instead of pluralism

Abstract

This book has established four things. First, it has shown how the asymmetrical structure of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) manifests as various constitutional problems. Although this conclusion is somewhat self-evident, the comprehensive approach that this book has adopted on the topic enables a better understanding of the political and constitutional implications of such asymmetry. Second, this book has shown how differences in the Member States’ constitutions affect the way in which the contestation by national courts towards the European Court of Justice and EU law takes place. In this regard, the book put forth the inequality thesis, according to which such differences mean that national courts are not able to induce more legitimacy into the EU’s political process; on the contrary, such inequality questions the legitimacy of national judicial review of EU law. In connection to the inequality thesis, the book presented a novel reading of Article 4(2) TEU: it has both a horizontal (protection of equality) and a vertical (protection of national identity) aspect. Third, based on the inequality thesis, this book has shown how constitutional pluralism cannot be the normative theory of European constitutionalism; that difficult constitutional issues cannot be left for the courts to settle, but rather that a political solution should be sought. Fourth, while the epistemic strand of constitutional pluralism has instigated interesting debates in European constitutional law scholarship and contributed towards theory-building, constitutional pluralism as a theory has ultimately been unable to resolve the problems from which the theory initially arose.