Abstract

After a pandemic, all countries experience a shortage in vaccine supply due to limited vaccine stocks and production capacity globally. One particular problem is that it is hard to predict demands for vaccines during the global crisis. On the other hand, vaccines are usually made and packaged in different places, raising logistical issues and concerns that can further delay distribution. In this paper, we propose an optimization formulation model to link infectious disease dynamics and supply chain networks considering a one-to-one relationship between demand and supply for vaccines. We focus on designing a vaccine coordination system using government subsidy that considers the equilibrium behaviors of manufacturers under an actual demand for the vaccine. This study evaluates vaccine manufacturers and government behaviors that help the vaccine market to reach the socially optimal. Different decisions, such as vaccine demands and vaccine production and distribution are investigated. A study of the monkeypox pandemic in the U.S. is performed to validate our model and its results. The obtained results from testing the proposed system problem revealed that the vaccine coverage increased by up to 35%, while the unmet demand reduced by up to 60%, in comparison to when vaccine manufacturers act individually.

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