Intertemporal Memories of a Shifting Unity

The lack of representations in the archaic period is not surprising, but its absence on vases and in the plastic arts of the fifth century is very significant. Except for its appearance in literature, especially in comedies, it was completely ignored until Hellenistic and Roman times when it degenerated into a romantic burlesque. Pfuhl 1 implies that prior to the Roman period when the painter represented Herakles as a clumsy, helpless sot, the hero was regarded as too much of a tragic figure to be used as the subject of ridicule in art. Certainly his legendary connection with Omphale was current in Attica long before Hellenistic times,2 as the comic poets amply testify.3 In fifth century Athens there was no exclusively tragic character, least of all Herakles, who could not be moulded by the dramatist to play another type of role,4 although, in general, heroes fitted much more appropriately into tragedy than divinities. In general, Pfuhl's statement is correct as far as Attica is concerned, and the exception in literature, as we shall see, has a very good reason. The non-Attic sculptor before Alexander the Great has given us little of the comic in the career of Herakles, unless we stretch the point by citing the experience of Herakles with the Kerkopes.5 Likewise the vase painter, except for a caricature,6 has treated his labors and sufferings in a serious vein;7 we must, of course, admit that the Caeretan hydria, which portrays Herakles raising havoc with Busiris and his attendants, is an outstanding example, from our viewpoint, of a humorous treatment,8 but in Attica the vase painter seems to have held himself aloof from such an inter-

List of Illustrations Preface 1. Introduction -Lisa C. Nevett 2. Structural Change in Archaic Greek Housing -Franziska Lang 3. Security, Synoikismos, and Koinon as Determinants for Troad Housing in Classical and Hellenistic Times -William Aylward 4. Household Industry in Anatolia and Greece -Nicholas Cahill 5. Living and Working around the Athenian Agora: A Preliminary Case Study of Three Houses -Barbara Tsakirgis 6. Between Urban and Rural: House-Form and Social Relations in Attic Villages and Deme Centers -Lisa C. Nevett 7. Houses at Leukas in Acarnania. A Case Study in Ancient Household Organization -Manuel Fiedler 8. Modest Housing in Late Hellenistic Delos -Monika Trumper 9. Housing the Poor and Homeless in Ancient Greece -Bradley A. Ault 10. Summing Up: Whither the Archaeology of the Greek Household? -Bradley A. Ault and Lisa C. Nevett Glossary Index Acknowledgments Contributors

International migrants may relocate because of economic, political and social factors in their origin or destination countries. Using global bilateral migration flows from 103 countries over the period 1990–2000, we explore whether emigrants self‐select based on economic, political and social institutions. Our study adds social dimension as a potential determinant of migration and separates the pull and push effects of political, economic and social institutions. Our results indicate that economic, political and social institutions are significant pull factors of migration; economic freedom has the most substantial pull effect followed by the political institutions; social institutions have the weakest pull effect on migration. Moreover, economic and social institutions are significant push factors of migration, while political institutions do not show any push effect. Furthermore, educated migrants are more sensitive to the destination economic, political and social institutions than less‐educated migrants, and less‐educated migrants are more sensitive to the social institutions at the origin.

172 PHOENIX collective experiences. Second, they should be acknowledged as significant factors in the making of Athenian policy, and not explained away as mere propagandist cover-up for the pursuit of power and expediency, as frequently seen in the so-called “Realist” approach to Greek history. Steinbock is definitely at his best in outlining the impact of social memory on Athenian politics and public discourse. When it comes, however, to exploring the workings of social memory itself—how and why certain events were preserved in the “collective consciousness” of the Athenians—his argument too frequently hinges on speculation and platitude. Although he deploys an impressive knowledge of literary, epigraphic, and archaeological sources, the conclusions he arrives at hardly ever aim at breaking new ground, and when they do, they lack persuasiveness. Explaining the Athenian memory of Thebes’ medism, or that of the Theban aid to Thrasybulus’ democrats, in terms of bad or good relationships between the two poleis respectively is, of course, legitimate; however, the attention and scholarship mustered by Steinbock to prove these arguments (105–106, 113–115, 254–267) give the inescapable impression of cracking a nut with a sledgehammer. The same can be said of the lengthy discussion on why the threat of Athens’ eradication in 404 b.c. was indeed a “traumatic” and therefore “persistent memory” (291–300). I remain unpersuaded by the argument attributing the recollection of Theban benefactions to the topographic proximity of Boeotia and Phyle (236–245), Thrasybulus’ first foothold on Attic soil, which indeed occupied a privileged place in Athenian public discourse. The book also suffers from excessive repetitiveness: three times, for instance (41, 290, 331–332), we are told the same story, along with all the relevant quotations, about Demosthenes’ recollection of the Theban proposal to raze Athens (19.65). My last quibble is the organization of the argument in each chapter, which, to my mind, is allowed too much meandering into issues only tangentially related to its main thrust, such as the Theban-Plataean antagonism (Chapter Two) or the inscriptional record of the capture of Phyle (Chapter Four). In the end, however, I believe this is a work worth recommending to the student of ancient Greek, and particularly Athenian, history. Though not always easy to follow and sometimes frustrating in the attention it lavishes on secondary or self-evident questions, it brings together formidable scholarship and provides an up-to-date and reliable discussion of many important issues, a good example being the funeral oration (49–58). University of Silesia, Katowice Janek Kucharski Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece. Edited by Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 2013. Pp. xxi, 286. The subject matter of this volume—which is sure to be cited a great deal in coming years—is at once both wider-ranging and more specific than its subtitle suggests. It is more wide-ranging because hoplite warfare has been of interest not just to military historians, but because it seems to be inextricably entangled with our understanding of the emergence and development of the polis as a distinctive social and cultural phenomenon. The focus is more specific in two ways. First, this book is not an introduction to or a survey of Greek land warfare. It is essentially historiographical: it is a contribution to, and an attempt to frame the terms for the future development of, a particular debate BOOK REVIEWS/COMPTES RENDUS 173 within modern scholarship. Second, it is primarily concerned with the archaic period, as the key moment of the influence of the military on the political. This chronological point causes problems for all scholars in the area (and not just the contributors to this volume), as relevant written material from the archaic period is exiguous at best and the archaeological record is not always conducive to answering the questions we want to ask. The editors make clear what they intend the book to do very early. Their introduction and first chapter both outline a history of what they call “the hoplite debate.” They posit a long-standing orthodoxy which has only relatively recently come under sustained attack from revisionists. These pieces are supplemented by two more...

Festivals are periods of time, cut out from daily life, during which a group performs activities that are most often thought of as communications with the superhuman world. Festival names in Greece and Rome often express this close connection with a divinity, a hero, or a human founder, or they refer to a ritual activity that is characteristic for a festival. The basic ritual elements that underlie a specific festival scenario are similar in both cultures (as well as in other cultures of the ancient Mediterranean world): processions, sacrifices with ensuing banquets, and athletic and musical contests are most common and exist already in the festival descriptions in Homer, such as the New Moon festival on Ithaca in the Odyssey. Common festivals founded and expressed group identity, first and foremost on the city level, but also for smaller and larger groups, from the family and clan group to the tribe or the community of all Hellenes. Greek and Roman festivals were so similar in their basic forms that, during the Imperial epoch, cities in the eastern part of the Empire adopted Roman festivals despite the fact that Greek cities followed a lunar calendar, whereas Rome early on had introduced a luni-solar system. The one festival type absent from the Roman world, at least during the Republican epoch, was the mystery ritual that, typically through a one-time initiation ritual, founded groups that transcended a single city, as well as the limits of gender and social status. During the Imperial epoch, both Rome and the cities of Greece continued their traditional festivals, but also developed their festival calendars in new directions, continuing and exploring innovations that had occurred already in Hellenistic times. An early development was ruler cult, developed in the Greek cities during Hellenistic times and adopted for the cult of Roman emperors, who exploited its potential to tie together a heterogeneous empire through shared cultic activities. The most important driving force was an understanding of divine power that was defined through its helpful manifestation and thus allowed the cult of outstandingly powerful humans. Wealthy citizens of Hellenistic cities also founded festivals in the memory of family members, and during the Imperial period, such foundations multiplied and gained in grandeur. The Imperial epoch also saw the extension of single festivals to events that lasted many days, if not an entire month and helped to shape the Christian festival calendar with its long festival periods.

Reviewed by: Women in Ancient Greece: A Source-book by Bonnie MacLachlan Lydia Matthews Bonnie MacLachlan. Women in Ancient Greece: A Source-book. Bloomsbury Sources in Ancient History. London: Continuum Books, 2012. Pp. xii + 232. US$39.95. ISBN 978144117930. MacLachlan provides a new addition to the growing range of sourcebooks catering to undergraduate courses on women’s lives in the ancient Mediterranean.1 Most of this volume is dedicated to ten chapters setting out the evidence for the lives of Greek women in the Classical period (Part 2). These chapters are flanked by four chapters on women in the Archaic period (Part 1), and one on Hellenistic women (Part 3). Following each chapter is a list of suggestions for further reading. [End Page 97] In Chapters 1–4 we are introduced first to a brief selection of sources from Hesiod, then to passages from the Homeric hymns to Aphrodite and Demeter. Chapters 3 and 4, “Women Divine and Mortal in the Homeric Epics” and “Women and Gender in the Melic and Lyric Poets,” are each much longer than the preceding ones, and the space given over to the selections from Alcman, Sappho, Alcaeus, Ibycus, Anacreon, Archilochus, Hipponax, and Semonides in Chapter 4 is well used. Next MacLachlan turns to the Classical period, introducing the reader to this by way of a long chapter (5), “The Lived Experiences of Girls and Women.” MacLachlan opens by acknowledging the difficulties that scholars encounter in locating contemporary evidence, and few readers will be altogether satisfied by the assurance that later sources are useful because “patterns of social behaviour are slow to change, particularly when reinforced by ritual.” Thus, a great deal of the epigraphic material that is presented in Part 2 is Hellenistic, and likewise many of the literary sources are either Hellenistic or Roman. The material is arranged thematically, detailing the experiences of childbirth, nubile women, married life, wool-working, pregnancy, concubines, wife abuse, adultery, lower-class women, slave women, older women, and women’s roles in death and funerals. Chapter 6, “Women and Property,” records the management of women’s dowries and women’s performance of financial transactions. MacLachlan contrasts a passage of Isaeus, noting the legal prohibition against women performing transactions involving sums greater than a medimnus, with passages from Lysias and Demosthenes describing women doing exactly that. This arrangement nicely illustrates some of the problems associated with taking statements in ancient sources about what women were or were not allowed to do under the law as reflecting the reality of lived experience. Chapter 7 deals with foreign women, with much of it given over to texts relating to Aspasia of Miletus. Chapter 8 collects sources on prostitutes and deals with a number of women in some detail, notably Rhodopis/Doricha (in Herodotus and Sappho)2 and Neaera (Apollodorus). Chapter 9 addresses the religious life of women at various stages in the female life cycle: rituals for young girls, for nymphae, marriage rituals, and rituals for women. Chapter 10 looks at women in the tragic and comic poets and is followed by a chapter called “Dorian Women,” the heading under which the women of Sparta and Gortyn in Crete are discussed. The extracts from the Gortyn law code are chosen to illustrate the liberal treatment of the women of this city in contrast to those of Athens. Here cross-references to the comparative Athenian material would have proved very valuable. The final three chapters of Section 2 are devoted to Platonic and Aristotelian discussions of women’s roles in the ideal state, warrior women (the Amazons, Telesilla, and Artemisia), and finally the female body in the writers of the Hippocratic corpus, Aeschylus, Plato, and Aristotle. [End Page 98] The final chapter of the book, “Women in the Hellenistic Era” (Part 3), contains a wide variety of interesting sources. Amongst these are marriage contracts from Ptolemaic Egypt, curse tablets, a wide selection of fragmentary female poets (Nossis, Anyte, Moero, and Erinna), and an epistolary record of women’s discussions of philosophy and its application to the problems of their own lives. As it stands, Part 3 is only slightly longer than the chapter on Homeric women in Part 1 and could...

The current phase in international relations can be best characterized by one word – transition. The Post-Cold War order is rapidly disappearing, creating strategic ambiguity for all actors. The U.S. hegemony is over or close to over despite the fact that militarily Washington will be safely far out of reach for several decades to come. However, the growing national debt, the looming crisis in the Social Security and Medicare systems, uncontrolled migration, growing populism and partisan fighting does not bode well for the future of U.S. dominance. At the same time, no nation, be it China, Russia, India or Brazil, has the necessary resources or will to compete for the new world hegemony. The absence of a world hegemon means that no state has the power to enforce the implementation of key international rules and norms. Regardless how one perceives the international principles – as balanced or biased – the rule-based order at least provides a minimal level of stability since the actors involved on the international stage have a clear understanding what may and may not be done. However, since the late 2000s the situation has changed. We are increasingly facing an international security architecture where key actors may easily break the norms and rules, and this will eventually bring us to a situation upon which no rules can be based. The election of President Trump sent shock waves through the United States’ political establishment and surprised international relations pundits worldwide. Despite the apparent growth of the right-wing populist movements in different parts of the world, the culmination of which was presumably the BREXIT referendum held in June 2016, few if any could imagine that a real estate developer and reality TV star had any chance of defeating one of the most respected representatives of the US political establishment. The November 2016 elections had widespread implications on both American domestic and foreign policies. President Trump’s decision to denounce globalism created a situation where the so-called “vertical globalism” (Western-led efforts to spread a liberal international order all over the world through the promotion of democracy and a market economy) might be transformed into a “horizontal globalism” based on regional integration models covering vast territories of Europe and Asia, Africa and Latin America. In this paper we will analyze President Trump’s foreign policy in several key geographical areas and its implications. However, in order to better understand the significant changes in U.S. foreign policy ushered in by President Trump and make predictions for future developments, it is worth starting with an examination of Trump’s foreign policy perceptions as well as of the ongoing debates within the foreign policy establishment itself.

As Yugoslavia entered into its final crisis in the spring of 1991, France was still recovering from the shock of the fall of the Berlin wall, which had shaken the very basis of French foreign policy. France could no longer exploit the bipolarity which had created so much room for an independent policy between the United States and the USSR. The unification of Germany, which France had accepted with great reluctance, upset the balance of power within the European Community (EC), which had always favoured unification. Finally, the end of the Cold War called into question a defence policy based on an independent nuclear deterrent. It is, therefore, by no means surprising that France, like the other members of the EC, was at sea when faced with the first major crisis of the new European order. However, if one looks beyond the fluctuations in French policy toward the various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, it becomes clear that this crisis acted as a catalyst in the process of adapting French foreign policy to the post-Cold War age. In particular, it underscored the limits of the capabilities of the budding European Union (EU) as a political institution and raised serious questions about the aim of establishing a treaty system for European security. Above all the crisis gave France an opportunity to reclaim its position as a leader, not just within the EU, but also worldwide. French policy toward the former Yugoslavia can be divided into three distinct periods: (1) from the beginning of the crisis in the summer of 1991 to the victory of the French right in the March 1993 parliamentary elections; (2) the so-called cohabitation period (April 1993 -- April 1995) between Socialist President Francois Mitterrand and the conservative government of Prime Minister Edouard Balladur; and (3) from Jacques Chirac's presidency in May 1995 to the signature of the Dayton peace accord in November 1995. During the first period, foreign policy making was dominated by Mitterrand, supported by his trusted foreign minister, Roland Dumas. It was a time of deep division, not only between the government and the opposition but also within the governing Socialist party. The main architect of French policy toward the former Yugoslavia during the second period was the Gaullist foreign minister, Alain Juppe. Despite the change of government in April 1993, everything indicates that the three main French foreign policy makers (the president, the prime minister, and the minister for foreign affairs) came to an agreement, even though the new government did not hesitate to criticize the policy of its predecessor.(f.1) In the third phase, Chirac sought to establish his mark with a vigorous foreign policy -- beginning with the former Yugoslavia. THE IMPOSSIBLE EUROPEAN SOLUTION The Yugoslav crisis should have given the European Community its first chance to prove that it could settle a problem in its own backyard. In fact, it showed just the opposite. After six months of fruitless attempts to find a solution, the EC was forced to hand the question over to the United Nations early in 1992. However, by sharing the lead in the peace negotiations with a United Nations special envoy, France managed to remain on the front line, at least until the Contact Group was formed in July 1994.(f.2) Unfortunately the crisis happened at the very time that the EC was reflecting on its own future. On the one hand, there was talk of expansion to include other West European countries and possibly some from Eastern Europe. And on the other, the existing member states were seeking ways of strengthening integration among themselves. Events in Yugoslavia were to show that the conditions for formulating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as provided for by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, were still far from being met. On the contrary, they revealed the deep divisions between the member states and their incapacity to agree on how to handle the break-up of the Yugoslav federation. They also highlighted the fragile nature of the Franco-German axis on which the dynamics of European integration depended. …

The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece

HEREAS, IN EARLIER TIMES, the East was the fertile womb of great religions, spawning them across the face of the world, in these times Western political ingenuity is reciprocating in an awesome compliment by transmitting to the politically infertile East viable political ideas and institutions. The phenomenon of liberated, underprivileged peoples seizing upon the political institutions and ideals of their former Western masters has become commonplace-so common that the significance of it needs analysis. A commentary par excellence on this political impact of West on East is the fact that all former colonial countries have embraced the outward forms of Western representative institutions. The departing captains and kings may or may not have left a legacy of enmity behind, but they have always left an admiration for their political talent. This largess to the Asian and African by the West is the great impact of these times. Hardly without exception, these freed people are creating constituent assemblies, writing constitutions, electing representative parliaments, making laws, organizing political parties, debating the merits of federal vs. unitary systems, separation of powers, ministerial responsibility, universal suffrage, human rights, independent judiciaries, economic planning and foreign policy.1 As often as not these political amateurs encounter a diversity of difficulties grafting imported political institutions onto indigenous customs and traditions and making them work. The absence too often of a strong sense of national unity, the paucity of democratic experiences, the weakness of political parties, and the impotence of other voluntary political groups plague them. The insidious interplay in a world of bipolar powers competing for allies and subverting new regimes before they are firmly set on their courses all contribute to the political instability so much in evidence today. Were it not that the prolonged struggles for freedom from alien Western rule have proven fruitful in breeding familiar Western instruments of revolutionary action there would be even more disorder.2

Considerable scholarly work has examined the transition to democracy. In this paper, we investigate a path to democracy that is very different from that typically described. During the Archaic period (800–500 BCE), many Greek poleis (city-states) replaced aristocracies with a more narrow governing institution—an autocrat known as the tyrant. Yet as classical scholars have noted, many of the poleis where tyrants reigned in the Archaic period became among the broadest democracies in the subsequent Classical period (500–323 BCE). We analyze a data set of ancient Greek political regime types and review the history of the best-known Archaic period tyrants in order to explore why a transitory narrowing of power—Greek tyranny was a transitory institution—can set the stage for democratization. We briefly consider other historical and modern examples. Our paper shows why an understanding of progress toward democracy requires recognizing the potential importance of nonmonotonic transition paths.

This study applies multiple indicator and multiple causes modeling to examine to what extent critical social analysis of inequality, a dimension of critical consciousness (CC), may be explained by political party identification (i.e., Republican vs. Democrat) or political ideology (i.e., conservative vs. liberal). These issues were examined among 237 public high school students from a large Midwestern city, who generally came from historically marginalized groups. Analyses suggest that political party identification was only marginally associated with critical social analysis of inequality and political ideology had a small positive association with critical social analysis of inequality. Further, political identification and political ideology only explained between 2% and 4% of the variance in critical social analysis of inequality. These results suggest complexity in how youth think about political institutions and inequality, while also providing evidence that a critical social analysis of inequality is largely independent of political identification and ideology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Do political parties matter when it comes to Canadian foreign policy? Conventional wisdom says they do. We often hear the argument that some past decision would not have been made if only another had been in power, or that some current policy is likely to be overturned as soon as another comes into power. The parties themselves have worked hard to encourage this way of thinking, playing up the coherence and continuity of foreign policy priorities within parties and the supposedly stark differences between them. Yet there are some enduring patterns in Canadian foreign policy that seem to over-ride differences. Governing parties sometimes pursue policies that seem starkly at odds with what they have told us about their purposes and priorities. And while Canadians seem to have strong feelings about parties' foreign policy choices, opinion polls suggest that foreign policy issues usually have little to do with most Canadians' voting decisions. In fact there are a number of reasons why we might expect political parties to matter very little in Canada, perhaps even less than in other comparable countries. How do we reconcile these apparent discrepancies? When and how does make a difference?Much has been written about the question of parties and foreign policy in Canada, but most of it takes the form of a passing reference here or there, never really explained or supported. We still do not yet have any sustained efforts to think about the question theoretically, or to try to answer the question systematically (as opposed to anecdotally) . This is particularly striking in the textbooks on Canadian foreign policy. Most of them have paid at least some attention to the role of parliament - or, in most accounts, the non -role of parliament - in foreign policymaking. But their concern is with the relationship between the prime minister and parliament as an institution, or between the cabinet and parliament in general terms, and they refer to parties and partisanship only incidentally.1 Kim Richard Nossal' s landmark The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy - which, as the title suggests, is specifically concerned with the political institutions and processes that bring about foreign policy decisions - covers political parties in about three pages.2 Nossal concludes that parties generally have not been important, mostly because of the broad consensus between the two major parties on foreign policy issues during the Cold War.3 This is probably correct, and might still be true even after the end of the Cold War. But even where there is broad agreement on foreign policy goals, there can still be important disagreements about how to pursue them, and these differences over means and details could still leave plenty of room for parties and partisanship to play a pivotal role in foreign policymaking.The question of parties and partisanship deserves more attention than it has received so far, whether we ultimately decide that parties are important or not. If parties and partisanship do matter, then we need to say more about when, why, and how, in much the same way that we would want to assess and explain the role of interest groups, the bureaucracy, or the news media. If parties don't matter, or matter very little, then that would seem to be important in itself, if for no other reason than the possible negative implications for Canadian democracy.4Before we can get started on answering the question, we need to untangle some of the different ways in which we might say that party matters. It might be that the major parties have consistently had different priorities when it comes to foreign policy, and that these different priorities have more or less consistently translated into different policies. It might be that the major parties do not have consistent priorities, but that their efforts to outmaneuver one another in the electoral game have shaped their positions on various foreign policy issues, which are sometimes translated into effects on actual policy outcomes. …

Children’s representations appear early in the Greek visual material culture: first they appear in the large funerary vases of the geometric period, while in the archaic period they appear in funerary reliefs and vases. To the representations in vase painting, those in terracotta statuettes can be added in the fifth century, but it is in the fourth century bc that children become a noteworthy subject of representation, appearing both in small- and large-scale objects in different media. This chapter considers the relationship between changing imagery of children in ancient Greece and social and religious developments from the geometric period, through the Hellenistic period and into the Roman period in Greece.

The article addresses the question how and why do written laws come into being in Ancient Greece in the archaic period from the mid seventh century BC. The research delves into different types of historical sources including stone inscriptions and literary works so that to illuminate fragments and details of how the people reflect on the necessity and significance of written laws. The assumption is that there is no one general explanation why people started to write down the laws. In Ancient Greece the general lasting rules that we call today laws were first denoted with the term “thesmos”, and later with the term “nomos”. In any case, the first written laws were publicly acknowledged and announced as a guarantee against the arbitrary power.