Interpreting Interpretation in Private Law

Abstract

Abstract The article addresses the following question: why do we interpret private law? My aim is, first of all, to make use of the theory of interpretation presented by Ronald Dworkin in Justice for Hedgehogs (Dworkin 2011) to emphasize the methodological importance of this issue. Second, the article casts doubt on the thesis that different interpretations of private law – for example, the so-called structuralist interpretations and instrumentalist interpretations such as the economic analysis of law – are rival interpretations. Like Dworkin, I argue that it is our interpretive responsibilities that define whether or not two interpretations of the same object should be treated as rivals. These responsibilities, in turn, are measured in light of the purpose of the interpretation. The interpretation of private law is a peculiar case of legal interpretation because it is not eminently concerned with determining the content of that law. On the other hand, if justification is the point of interpreting private law, then there seems to be no reason why different interpretations should necessarily be interpretations in competition with each other. The justification of private law may depend on a plurality of normative injunctions being met, and the features by which private law satisfies these injunctions can be highlighted sometimes by one interpretation, sometimes by another.