Abstract
The purpose of this research is to analyse two distinct readings of Spinoza's metaphysics made by two great interpreters of the twentieth century: Curley and Wolfson. The first is treated through logical terms and the relation that the propositions of Spinoza's Ethics have among them, explaining the relationship between the author and Cartesianism of his time. The second is treated through a detailed philology of a tradition of texts prior to the author, explaining the relationship beteween Spinoza and the Jewish Medieval Aristotelian tradition.
Highlights
There is no consensus among contemporty readers on how Spinoza brings his notion of a single substance
The second is treated through a detailed philology of a tradition of texts prior to the author, explaining the relationship beteween Spinoza and the Jewish Medieval Aristotelian tradition
The author maintains that Spinoza's monism is an extrapolation of the definition of substance that Descartes provides in the Principles, in which, truthly, only God can be substance, excluding the finite bodies, once that susbtance is “that which is conceived by itself”
Summary
There is no consensus among contemporty readers on how Spinoza brings his notion of a single substance. Abstract The purpose of this research is to analyse two distinct readings of Spinoza's metaphysics made by two great interpreters of the twentieth century: Curley and Wolfson. The first is treated through logical terms and the relation that the propositions of Spinoza's Ethics have among them, explaining the relationship between the author and Cartesianism of his time.
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