Abstract
If either (i) domestic residents hold shares of the foreign firm or (ii) foreigners hold shares of the domestic firm, an export subsidy can reduce rather than increase national welfare within the Brander-Spencer model. Two sufficient conditions for such a case are presented. Also discussed are the optimal export policies in the presence of international cross shareholdings. [F 12]
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