Abstract
This research explores the optimal export policy of a domestic industry characterized by numerous multinational enterprises (MNEs) co-existing with cross-border ownership investments in foreign firms and exports to a foreign country. We demonstrate that the optimal export policy depends on whether MNEs make centralized or decentralized decisions in ownership investments. With decentralized decision-making, the optimal export policy can be either a subsidy or a tax, while with centralized decision-making, it is a tax. Furthermore, we examine how the optimal trade policy responds to the optimal strategy of centralized decision-making by MNEs. Our results show that under certain circumstances, the optimal trade policy is an export subsidy, and MNEs prefer to voluntarily relinquish centralized decision-making, even when they have the option to control the production levels of foreign partner firms.
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