Abstract
This paper is an attempt at analysing the intricacies between international law, the concept of Responsibility to Protect and its implications for the sovereignty of modern states. The paper examines how the concept of responsibility to protect (as stipulated by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)) impacts on the sovereignty of states. It adopts the essay style of writing and reviews a number of documents on the subject of international law, sovereignty and the responsibility to protect.
 
 The paper consequently argues that though the ICISS claims that its “purpose is not to license aggression with fine words, or to provide strong states with new rationales for doubtful strategic designs” (ICISS, 2001, p. 35), the Commission’s very attempt to exempt the permanent five and other so-called major powers from intervention does just that whether intentionally or unintentionally. It consequently recommends that much effort should be made to address the inequalities within the international system through the formulation of appropriate policies and international regulations that address the sovereign equality of states in the international system, especially on the question of intervention.
Highlights
Morgenthau, Edward Hallet Carr, and Alfred Zimmern have posited that “law is fundamentally political and in relations between states the content of international law is determined by dominant states and will not be upheld when it conflicts with their perceived political interests”
With regards to the ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia (1990), as well as “Operation Provide Comfort” in northern Iraq (1991), and NATO’s controversial military intervention over Kosovo (1999), Kritsiotis has indicated that each case at a first glance “would appear to bode ill for the relevance of international law and its impact on the processes of political decision-making within the intervening states.”
Failure to do so implies that other responsible states have the “responsibility to interfere in the offending state’s internal affairs.”. This forms the basis for humanitarian intervention – a practice which according to Etzioni “turns what was once a taboo of international relations into a moral imperative.” (Etzioni, 2006, p. 73)
Summary
Law has over the years been perceived as a traditionally “contingent institutional expression” of politics – which is primarily the “intersection of issues of identity, purpose, ethics, and strategy.” (Reus-Smit, 2004) For instance, the philosophy of John Austin postulates that the law “is essentially the effective command of a superior.” it is argued that what the law entails is “not at all a vague and general impression that something ought to be done, but a definite, precise order necessitating certain ‘acts or forbearances.’” (Merriam Jr., 2001, pp. 70-71) This makes much sense, especially when one perceives politics as a means to the distribution of power. (Dahl, 1957) It implies that in any given society or community of persons, the sovereign is the ultimate “source of law” and is “above the binding force of its own decrees.” The assumption is that the ultimate source of power cannot be bound by the very laws that s/he pronounces “since there is no power by whom such obligations can be interpreted or enforced” and that “the law giver cannot be legally bound by his own law, great the moral obligation incurred.” (Merriam Jr., 2001, p. 74). With regards to the ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia (1990), as well as “Operation Provide Comfort” in northern Iraq (1991), and NATO’s controversial military intervention over Kosovo (1999), Kritsiotis has indicated that each case at a first glance “would appear to bode ill for the relevance of international law and its impact on the processes of political decision-making within the intervening states.” These cases give a clear indication of the “absence of a conventional basis and authorisation from the Security Council in accordance with its enforcement powers” as provided in Chapter VII of the UN Charter amounting to breaches of the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force. With regards to the ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia (1990), as well as “Operation Provide Comfort” in northern Iraq (1991), and NATO’s controversial military intervention over Kosovo (1999), Kritsiotis has indicated that each case at a first glance “would appear to bode ill for the relevance of international law and its impact on the processes of political decision-making within the intervening states.” these cases give a clear indication of the “absence of a conventional basis and authorisation from the Security Council in accordance with its enforcement powers” as provided in Chapter VII of the UN Charter amounting to breaches of the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force. (Kritsiotis, 2004, p. 68)
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