International Courts and Tribunals – the New Environmental Sentinels in International Law

This article seeks to place under scanner the role of international courts and tribunals (ICTs) as important agents for the peaceful settlement of international disputes through the instrumentality of law. The rapid upswing in the number of specialized international courts and tribunals (in areas such as trade, human rights, law of the sea, criminal justice and environment) can be perceived as an attempt by the sovereign states to maintain viability of the ICTs in light of perplexity in international relations, growing recognition of peaceful co-existence, quest for institutionalized cooperation and emergence of some of the ‘Common Concerns of Humankind’ and the ‘Duty to Cooperate’. It has sought to make sense of emergence of ICTs as the ‘New Environmental Sentinels’. Do we need a specialized International Environmental Court (IEC) as an ‘ideal’? What does it portend for our common future?

This article seeks to place under scanner the role of international courts and tribunals (ICTs) as important agents for the peaceful settlement of international disputes through the instrumentality of law. The rapid upswing in the number of specialized international courts and tribunals (in areas such as trade, human rights, law of the sea, criminal justice and environment) can be perceived as an attempt by the sovereign states to maintain viability of the ICTs in light of perplexity in international relations, growing recognition of peaceful co-existence, quest for institutionalized cooperation and emergence of some of the ‘Common Concerns of Humankind’ and the ‘Duty to Cooperate’. It has sought to make sense of emergence of ICTs as the ‘New Environmental Sentinels’. Do we need a specialized International Environmental Court (IEC) as an ‘ideal’? What does it portend for our common future?

Regional human rights courts like the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the African Court of Human and People's Rights (ACtHPR) have become popular sites of mobilization for victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home. Besides being platforms for individual remedy, human rights courts increasingly shape social norms and state policy within countries, making them attractive avenues for rights advocates to develop new norms or to push domestic authorities to reform legislation. The judges of these courts can decide, for example, whether same-sex couples have a right to be married, if prisoners have the right to vote or receive HIV/AIDS treatment, or when a state can deport illegal immigrants to a country where they will likely be tortured. As these courts pass their judgments, they often find themselves in conflict with states that are violating human rights of marginalized groups on a large scale and are unwilling to implement international rulings. Although international human rights courts have become increasingly popular venues among victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home, we are only beginning to understand how activists play roles in shaping the development of regional human rights courts' case law—the body of judgments that shapes how judges will make their decisions in the future. We now have plenty of international relations and international legal research on the interactions between states and international courts: how judges in these courts wrestle between deferring to the interests of member state governments whose actions are on trial and sticking closely to the conventions' fundamental yet evolving principles (Alter et al., 2019; Helfer & Voeten, 2014). As some states begin to resist international courts' authority, scholars have begun to examine the dynamics of this backlash (Hillebrecht, 2022; Madsen et al., 2018; Sandholtz et al., 2018). Recent studies have also demonstrated that human rights advocates—whether NGOs or individual lawyers—have a significant impact on shaping the jurisprudence of international courts and the impact judgments have in concrete locations (Kahraman, 2018; Sundstrom, 2014; van der Vet, 2012; Kurban, 2020; Conant, 2018; Harms, 2021; Cichowski, 2016; Hodson, 2011; Haddad, 2018). Meanwhile, these advocates themselves have been subject to repression and stigmatization by governments as part of the backlash phenomenon. Without an adequate understanding of the factors shaping activists' engagement with international courts, we risk undervaluing their strategic impact on the expansion of case law, the human rights protection of marginalized groups who cannot find remedies at home, and the domestic implementation of these judgments in an age of state backlash. In this section, we summarize the three papers contained in this symposium and their original contributions to these themes. Over the last decade, dozens of countries have erected legal barriers or started vilifying campaigns to stymie the work of NGOs (Buyse, 2018; Chaudhry, 2022). One tactic in this toolkit is the enactment of burdensome regulation on NGOs that receive funds from foreign donors as they allegedly promote foreign agendas (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013; Dupuy et al., 2021). States that frequently abuse human rights are especially prone to target NGOs that engage in strategic litigation (Hillebrecht, 2019). Most NGOs depend on foreign funding, and NGOs that litigate international cases fall disproportionately in this category, but do funders affect the selection of cases? In “Foreign Agents or Agents of Justice? Private Foundations, NGO Backlash, and International Human Rights Litigation,” Heidi Haddad and Lisa Sundstrom examine the extent to which Western donors, particularly private foundations, have encouraged NGOs in Europe to litigate at the ECtHR as a human rights advocacy strategy. They examine overall patterns of donor funding and NGO litigation records, and look in more detail at the case of Russian NGOs' foreign funding and litigation records. The analysis is extremely timely, as the Russian government's criminalization of independent civil society actors, especially in the human rights field, and their accusation that foreign funding turns NGOs into “foreign agents” have been crucial elements of the Russian regime's autocratization. This claim has also provided fuel for Russia's disenchantment with the ECtHR in recent years, contributing to the assessment of many observers that Russia's full-scale attack on Ukraine was the last straw in an inevitable collision course leading to its exit from the Council of Europe. Haddad and Sundstrom debunk the idea that foreign donors are pushing NGOs toward strategies of human rights litigation. Instead, they argue, there is more evidence that NGOs themselves promoted the mechanism of international litigation as a strategy that donors later adopted. This article is a poignant reminder of the advocacy tools that Russian human rights activists and citizens have lost as a result of their government's departure from the Council of Europe, including ECtHR jurisdiction. Yet it also provides insight into the likely roles of foreign donors in other country cases where NGOs are using international court litigation as a human rights advocacy strategy, which is often a target of the ire of national governments, as explored in the next article in the symposium. When states attack human rights NGOs within their borders and/or international human rights courts themselves, how does this affect the willingness of those NGOs to take cases to international courts, and the ways in which they do so? De Silva and Plagis ask this question in their article about state backlash against NGOs in the case of Tanzania and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. A fascinating empirical question they pose is: does state backlash against NGOs increase NGO litigation at international courts (to contest state repression at those courts and use international mechanisms when domestic ones are not available), roughly in line with Keck and Sikkink's famous “boomerang pattern” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), or decrease it due to heightened fear and restricted NGO capabilities that state repression creates? Employing a process-tracing analysis of NGOs' involvement in three cases before the African Court at different stages of the Tanzanian government's backlash against the Court, De Silva and Plagis find that “two-level backlash” by states can result in both phenomena, either promoting or deterring NGO legal mobilization at international human rights courts, depending on certain conditions. The three selected cases concerning the death penalty, the rights of persons with albinism, and the rights of pregnant schoolgirls and mothers, which took place at different time periods, demonstrate a number of patterns of state backlash interacting with NGO strategies. The authors find that domestic-level state backlash deterred domestic NGOs from partnering with international NGOs in litigation, but that such backlash, when it repressed domestic political and legal mobilization opportunities, actually encouraged both Tanzanian and international NGOs to turn to the African Court more frequently to seek remedies. International-level backlash in turn only deterred NGOs from international litigation when such backlash consisted of state efforts to restrict NGOs' ability to engage in litigation, and not when the international backlash was in the form of routine noncompliance with African Court rulings. Importantly, the authors find that NGO responses to state backlash were significantly shaped by their degree of legal consciousness and expertise with the rules, proceedings, and workings of the African Court. Those NGOs with less knowledge and experience were more likely to back away from engaging with the Court under the pressure of state backlash. De Silva and Plagis conclude that “NGOs' persistent human rights advocacy in the face of state backlash is a double-edged sword,” in the sense that they may not be deterred by state backlash initially, but there is a danger that their continued determination to engage in international litigation could prompt governments to engage in even more severe forms of backlash, with critical impacts on international courts and already vulnerable human rights defenders. Rights advocates have a growing menu of institutions and courts available to them. How do activists choose at which institution to lodge their cases in a world where legal remedies have diversified, or as some have argued, fragmented (Koskenniemi & Leino, 2002)? In “What Makes an International Institution Work for Labor Activists? Shaping International Law through Strategic Litigation,” Filiz Kahraman goes beyond the tendency of legal mobilization studies to only examine how activists interact with a single court or institution. Instead, Kahraman opens up how rights advocates imagine which institution is most receptive to their claims. Drawing on a comparative interview study of British and Turkish trade union activists and their legal mobilization campaigns at international courts and quasi-judicial institutions like the International Labor Organization (ILO), Kahraman examines how activists first probe and then strategically identify which court or international institution is most susceptible to their primary goals of influencing structural reforms and setting new norms. Through this probing process—or dynamic signaling game between courts and litigants—activists push a court's jurisprudence and case law into new issue areas. For instance, at the ECtHR, Turkish trade unionists challenged domestic courts' ruling that public sector workers did not have the right to establish unions, even though the ECtHR had no established case law on labor rights in 1990s. They won the case, with the ECtHR finding that Turkey violated the right of public sector workers to unionize. These cases not only had an impact within Turkey, but over the next decades, similar cases brought by British unionists would spin off the early precedent set by the Turkish legal mobilization efforts. Kahraman argues that they ultimately pushed the ECtHR to recognize the basic trade union rights as fundamental human rights. Kahraman sheds light on the often hidden strategies behind international litigation. Activists litigate not just for the immediate impact on the current case they work on, but how they envision that all the cases they work on may shape norms and domestic structural reforms further in the future. Whether an institution is perceptive of claims lies in the eye of the beholder. Kahraman finds that besides targeting institutions with high compliance rates, they also take cases to institutions with low rates of compliance, especially “if these institutions have extensive judicial authority to create new international norms.” So, it is not the de jure protection set by an international courts, but rather how activists perceive the juridical responsiveness and judicial authority of courts—or, how judges adopt either an activist approach or restraint in response to incoming cases and how willing states are to implement cases of a court, respectively—that determines why activists select certain courts or quasi-judicial institutions (like the ILO). Kahraman gives us new tools to interpret how activists perceive authority and receptiveness and respond to opportunities. Rather than static external legal remedies, courts and quasi-judicial institutions are opportunity structures that are malleable to the strategic vision of the activist or litigant. The articles in this symposium together reveal a number of key overlapping insights. At the broadest level, they demonstrate that activists' behaviors and strategies influence international courts' jurisprudence, politics within states, and the human rights outcomes of everyday citizens—and these influences have often been hidden in our existing canon of research on international courts. In addition, all of these articles show that, while activists may face challenges in their efforts, often including significant backlash from their home state governments, they also continue to retain significant agency through their creative efforts to develop legal strategies and circumvent state repression. Activists perennially innovate: sparking the ideas that inspire donors who fund them; calculating how to continue their litigation work when government actors threaten them; and taking risks in litigation to push courts to expand how they define human rights. However, along with these uplifting conclusions, there are worrying patterns that demand future research. States are increasingly pushing back against the powers of international courts to bind them to costly measures, and as this symposium has shown, national governments often point to activists as contributors to this “problem” of invasive international human rights standards. A growing body of research has tracked how human rights defenders of all kinds globally are under threat from actors like governments and corporations who disagree with their contentious actions. We need more studies that gather comprehensive data and systematically track these threats, specifically with regard to activists who engage in international human rights litigation. We suspect that such activists are likely disproportionately targeted due to the international visibility of their complaints. We also desperately need research into possible innovative responses to these threats to activists—responses from activists, funders, governments of countries that support human rights, and international courts themselves. Freek van der Vet is a University Researcher at the Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki and the principal investigator of the Toxic Crimes Project. Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom is Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. She is the director of the ActinCourts network at UBC and conducts research on legal mobilization by Russian activists.

To better understand the dynamics between states and international human rights courts, international relations scholars must incorporate a systematic understanding of how nongovernmental rights activists influence the decisions of international human rights courts—for instance, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights—and the impacts of those decisions on the ground, despite growing state backlash against international human rights courts. To date, several bodies of literature have considered these questions, but none have placed nongovernmental activists’ roles in full focus. The international relations and international law scholarship on judicialization of international politics and state compliance often acknowledges but does not thoroughly examine the role of activists in international law. In contrast, a second body of scholarship, on transnational advocacy networks and legal mobilization, often does theorize the role of activists in international and domestic politics but rarely focuses on activism in international human rights courts. While both bodies of literature acknowledge that nonstate actors influence the practice of international human rights courts, they have not proposed an analytical framework that encapsulates the dynamic relationships among nonstate actors, states, and international human rights courts. By proposing a framework on these relationships, we argue that, beyond simply influencing the outcome of a case in an international court, rights activists—whether NGOs or individual cause lawyers—have multiple reverberating effects upon all stages of case development and political impact. We identify and illustrate three fields in which the strategic efforts of activists play out, with significant consequences for courts’ authority over time. These fields are: (1) strategic litigation activity, (2) advocacy to improve states’ implementation of international human rights courts’ jurisprudence, and (3) responses to state backlash. Taken together, these fields can point us to an analytical path to study the practices of rights activists at international courts.

The very purpose of international law is the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Over centuries, states and more recently, organizations have created substantive rules and principles, as well as affiliated procedures, in the pursuit of the peaceful settlement of disputes. This volume of the Library of Essays in International Law focuses on the classic procedures of peaceful settlement: negotiation, good offices, inquiry, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and agencies for dispute resolution. The introduction provides a unique historic overview, explaining how the procedures first developed and changed over time. Each chapter features a seminal essay that helped create the changes described in the introduction. Being at the center of international law, dispute resolution has always been a core topic of international scholarship, this volume brings together for the first time, the pivotal writing in the field.

The Nuremberg tribunal was the expression and the beginning of states' recognition of their duty to prosecute genocide and other gross human rights violations. It was a first step towards fulfillin...

International law governing the settlement of disputes through law-based forums, such as courts, tribunals and arbitral tribunals, is fraught with limitations that are becoming especially apparent with respect to disputes that involve the protection of the environment. However, despite the deficiencies of the law, international courts and tribunals have issued judgements in disputes involving the protection of the environment. At the global level, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) have handed down decisions in relevant cases. In addition, other legal forums can also be called upon to decide cases involving international environmental law. Such forums include the Environmental Chamber of the ICJ and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) under its general facilities and under the Environmental Facility that it is planning to establish. Similarly, special bodies, such as the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), may decide on cases. Moreover, regional forums such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Community (ECJ) have ruled on cases involving international environmental law. Despite the these developments, calls for the establishment of an international environmental court at the global level persist. Several arguments have been advanced to justify the establishment of an international environmental court, for example the very many pressing environmental problems that exist today and the need for a bench consisting of experts in international environmental law to consider these problems, the need for individuals and groups to have access to environmental justice at the international level, the need to enable international organizations to be parties to disputes related to the protection of the environment and the need for dispute settlement procedures that enable the common interest in the environment to be addressed. Arguments against the establishment of an international environmental court have been advanced as well. This publication explores the arguments for and against the establishment of an international environmental court, examining topics such as the definition of an international environmental dispute and the concomitant expertise required on the bench, fragmentation and its root causes, access to justice and the representation of community interests. The author argues that the establishment of an international environmental court is not the most desirable option and she suggests that it might be more fruitful if we consider developments in environmental law, as well as in other relevant areas of international law, from a different perspective, namely, that of administrative law, and reassess the relationship between international and national law. Such an approach, she argues, is warranted if, inter alia, viable means for resolving environmental disputes that may arise are to be identified.

This chapter discusses the rise of international adjudication as a means of peaceful settlement of international disputes. The rise of international adjudication is noticeable in three aspects: (1) States are now more willing to create international courts or tribunals; (2) States are more willing to acknowledge the jurisdiction of international courts or tribunals; and (3) States are now more willing to submit their disputes to international adjudication. The recent rise of international adjudication has much to do with fundamental changes that took place in international relations, such as the Cold War, globalization, democratization, and global expansion of human rights norms. As international adjudication is an attempt by States to settle their disputes peacefully through the application of international law, its rise should be viewed as a positive phenomenon which can contribute to the maintenance of international peace and stability. Keywords:globalization; international adjudication; international disputes

I want to make three points in connection with David's lecture, looking at his subject from my own perspective, i.e., that of a judge in an international criminal tribunal. First, I want to consider the specific function of international criminal courts and tribunals as finders. Secondly, I will examine how international criminal courts fit into David's theoretical picture of top-down versus bottom-up judicial bodies. Thirdly, I wish to convey some of my concerns arising from the multiplication of proceedings (criminal and civil) arising from the same facts before different international courts and tribunals. International Criminal Courts as Truth Finders A new feature of the international legal order in the past few decades has undoubtedly been the reemergence of international criminal courts, with the ad hoc criminal tribunals of the United Nations (the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)), the regional mixed international tribunals (Sierra Leone, Cambodia, East Timor), and the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). The driving impulses behind the creation of these institutions may, as David mentioned in his lecture, differ from those behind the classical international courts and tribunals. One of the functions of international criminal law courts is that of providing a historical account and achieving reconciliation of post-conflict societies that have gone through a painful episode of mass atrocities. This is something which they share with another newcomer in the international legal order, and reconciliation commissions (TRCs), which in part originate from the same generating impulses. The latter may even be complementary to international criminal adjudication, as Tom suggested in his Holocaust memorial lecture, wondering whether the post-World War II criminal proceedings in Nuremberg should not have been complemented by a commission that could have examined the greater patterns of the historical behind the holocaust. (1) According to some, international criminal courts have, as far as finding process is concerned, little to add to the truth as it is revealed by journalists or historians, who base themselves on largely the same sources. I beg to disagree with that view. The finding process before criminal courts is of a different qualitative nature, because it is obtained through the specific rules of evidence that apply in criminal proceedings, above all the presumption of innocence and the prosecutorial burden of proof. What has been established by a criminal court following a correct procedure can therefore be said to be more credible in terms of its truthfulness than the produced by journalism or history writing. For example, for those who would wish to deny the Srebrenica massacre, it may have been easier to do so when only journalistic and historical accounts of the 1995 event were available than it is today after the judgments of the ICTY in which two panels of judges (first the Trial Chamber and thereafter the Appeals Chamber) found the facts to be established. This function of finding, and the contribution to history writing that results from this, may be one of the core missions for international criminal courts. In post conflict societies, different versions of the traumatic events often compete with each other. (2) It is extremely difficult for national courts in a post conflict society to make an unbiased assessment of these different versions, especially shortly after the events. This assessment is, however, a crucial factor in the process of transition. Without it, post conflict societies will have little more than annals of these traumatic events, produced by journalists and historians. (3) Through the process of judicial fact finding, international criminal courts help to sort out competing accounts of traumatic events in a conflict situation and to determine the account that will count as the official history that society. …

Contemporary institutions of international cooperation are very diverse, a particular example of which are international courts and tribunals. The past few decades have seen a very dynamic development of such institutions of international cooperation. Not only do they take an active part in settling regular international disputes between states, but also play a role in implementing state obligations arising under their membership in international organisations. With respect to the latter role, judicial bodies act as not only international courts, but they also perform the functions of constitutional courts, administrative courts and labour tribunals. Moreover, the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals is being extended onto the process of implementing the international law of human rights and international humanitarian law. From the point of view of international law, the legal status, structure and competence of contemporary international courts and tribunals are very diverse. This is due to the nature and content of their constituent instruments. The determining criterium of classifying a court as international is its formation by an international treaty, usually a multilateral one. Permanent courts formed by such treaties usually operate within the institutional framework of international organizations (ICJ, CJEU, ECHR) and do not have their own international legal personalities. However, it may happen that a permanent judicial body formed by an international treaty operates outside the framework of an international organisation and has its own international legal personality (ICC). This is different compared to the formation of ad hoc judicial bodies. Their legal basis can be both international treaties, including bilateral treaties (e.g. RSCSL-SCSL), and UN Security Council resolutions (e.g. ICTY, ICTR, IRMCT). Some of the international criminal tribunals are the so-called hybrid tribunals. They are specific in nature and are referred to as internationalized tribunals. Their status is clearly different than that of other tribunals, as is the legal basis for their formation and the degree of their internationalisation. Due to the above-mentioned issues, the legal status of international courts is diversified. They need to be analysed against the backdrop of the underlying issue of subjectivity of international law, and also with reference to the law of treaties and the law of the international organisations.

As this volume demonstrates, scholarly interest in international law's intersection with international politics is growing. Much international law (IL) scholarship excludes international courts (ICs) from the conversation, dismissing as irrelevant or dysfunctional the international legal institutions that elaborate and help enforce the law. The proliferation, rising usage, and growing political importance of international courts around the world makes this standard disclaimer increasingly less viable. Many domains of IL – international economic law, human rights law, criminal law, administrative law, and even constitutional law – have become judicialized. The judicialization of international relations (IR) occurs when courts gain authority to define what the law means and where litigation becomes a useful way to reopen political agreements. Negotiations among actors become debates about what is legally permissible, and politics takes place in the shadow of courts, with the lurking possibility of litigation shaping actor demands and political outcomes. In an effort to broaden the debate about the role of ICs in the international legal system, this chapter draws from a study of the universe of operational ICs, examining ICs as a category of actors. Section I, “The Twenty-First Century International Judicial Order,” gives an overview the international judicial system as it exists today. Section II, “The Four Roles of International Courts,” describes the four roles that states have delegated to ICs. The enforcement role has ICs assessing state compliance with IL. The administrative review role involves ICs reviewing the decisions of administrative actors in cases raised by private litigants. The constitutional review role has courts assessing the legal validity of legislative and government actions vis-a-vis higher-order legal obligations. The dispute settlement role is perhaps the broadest judicial role, in that ICs have the general jurisdiction to issue binding interpretations in any dispute that is brought. After defining the four roles, I map these roles onto the universe of ICs in operation as of 2006, reporting the result of a coding of the statutes where the jurisdictions of the twenty-five ICs are defined.

Climate change is the justice challenge of our century, and the increasingly serious impacts of climate change on human societies and ecosystems are raising important international legal challenges. States and stakeholders are appealing to international courts for clarity concerning their responsibilities in the global response to climate change, as well as their accountability for climaterelated loss and damage. Through advisory proceedings, these institutions are being asked to clarify the legal obligations of States in addressing climate change, including the prevention of ocean impacts, the protection of human rights, and in international law more broadly. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are at the forefront of such proceedings with the potential to reshape international climate law and governance. In this article, expert legal scholars highlight the significance of climate advisory proceedings in these tribunals, briefly underlining the legal reasoning of the ITLOS advisory opinion, its implications for international climate governance, and the questions and arguments before the IACtHR and the ICJ. The article explores, in the context of global efforts to implement the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and other climate litigation including in international courts and tribunals, the transformative potential of recent advisory opinions sought from the ITLOS, the IACtHR and the ICJ. In their responses to the pressing need for legal clarity in a world grappling with unprecedented climate challenges, the article suggests, courts are offered an historic opportunity to shape the contributions of international law to global sustainability, justice and the survival of life on Earth.

Between 1817 and 1871, bilateral treaties between Britain and several other countries (eventually including the United States) led to the establishment of international courts for the suppression of the slave trade. Though all but forgotten today, these anti-slavery courts were the first international human rights courts. They were made up of judges from different countries. They sat on a permanent, continuing basis and applied international law. They were explicitly aimed at promoting humanitarian objectives. Over the lifespan of the treaties, the courts heard more than 600 cases and freed almost 80,000 slaves found aboard illegal slave trading vessels. During their peak years of operation, the courts heard cases that may have involved as many as one out of every four or five ships involved in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. These international anti-slavery courts have been given scant attention by historians, and have been almost completely ignored by legal scholars. Most legal scholars view international courts and international human rights law as largely a post-World War II phenomenon, with the Nuremberg trials of the Nazi war criminals as the seminal moment in the turn to international law as a mechanism for protecting individual rights. But in fact, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the nineteenth century slavery abolition movement was the first successful international human rights campaign, and international treaties and courts were its central features. In addition to being of intrinsic historical interest, the story of the anti-slavery courts has important implications for contemporary issues in international law. The history of the anti-slavery courts reveals a more complex interrelationship between state power, moral ideas, and domestic and international legal institutions than many contemporary theories of international law and relations acknowledge. Moreover, the anti-slavery movement’s use of international law and legal institutions as part of a broader social, political and military strategy can help us better understand the potential role of international law today in bringing about improvements in human rights.

The multiplication of international courts is one of the most remarkable changes in international law and relations of the post–Cold War era. Admittedly, international courts are not a recent phenomenon. The first international courts date back to the early years of the 20th century. However, since the early 1990s the number of international judicial bodies has multiplied, the scope of their jurisdiction has expanded, and the number of the cases handled and judgments rendered has grown from a few a year to a steady stream that often has considerable impact on international relations and the lives of individuals worldwide. Depending on how international courts are defined, one can count more than two dozen of such bodies currently active, at very different degrees, both at the global and the regional level. If one were to add also those that are inactive or barely active, have been terminated, or never started operating, the tally can easily reach more than three dozen. This phenomenon has been tracked and analyzed by a vast and rapidly growing literature, fed by two main wells of scholarship. Indeed, international courts have been intensively studied by legal scholars––specifically of international law––first, and then by political scientists––in particular, those specializing in international relations. By and large each of the two learned groups has approached the same object of study from different perspectives, often at different levels of resolution, focusing on different aspects and ultimately using different interpretative tools. Yet both have yielded theoretical and functional insight that must be taken into account if a proper understanding of the phenomenon is to be achieved. It should be noted that in the literature, international courts are also called international tribunals. Albeit the terms courts and tribunals do not designate exactly the same kind of institutions, they are often used interchangeably, so much so that the generic expression “international courts and tribunals” (ICTs) is often preferred. Other, more technical and usually employed, designations are “international judicial body” and “international adjudicative body,” although the latter expression usually includes both international courts and tribunals, which are permanent institutions, and arbitral tribunals, which are ad hoc and temporary (see Definitions).

This Survey covers materials reflecting Chinese practice in 2011 relating to: I. Fundamental principles of international law (principles of non-use of force; principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes; principle of non-intervention of internal affairs; rule of law at the national and international levels); II. International law of treaties (reservations to treaties; effects of armed conflicts on treaties); III. Recognition of new states and governments (Republic of South Sudan; Libyan National Transitional Council); IV. State immunity; V. China's territorial integrity (Taiwan; Tibet; China–India border issue; Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands; Nansha Islands); VI. Polar regions (Antarctic; Arctic); VII. International law of the sea (general position; Chunxiao oil and gas field in East China Sea; South China Sea; China–Vietnam Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding Settlement of Sea Issues; marine environment; marine biodiversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction; sustainable fisheries; Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf; International Seabed Authority; International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; Somalia piracy); VIII. International law on outer space; IX. International human rights law (General position; rights of the child; Human Rights Council; Implementation of human rights instruments); X. International humanitarian law (protection of civilians in armed conflicts); XI. International law on disasters (protection of persons in the event of disasters); XII. International law on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (general position; Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty; abandoned Japanese chemical weapons in China; landmines); XIII. International criminal law (International Criminal Court; the Bashir case; Mr. LIU Daqun elected as judge of international residual mechanism for criminal tribunals; UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon; scope and application of universal jurisdiction; immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction; measures to eliminate international terrorism; decision on issues concerning strengthening anti-terrorism work; ratification of China–Russia Agreement on Cooperation in Fighting against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism; UN investigation of war crimes in Sri Lanka; law enforcement cooperation along the Mekong River among China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand; Bilateral Treaty on Extradition and Treaty on Assistance in Criminal Matters with Italy; transfer of a British suspect of pornographic crimes to the United Kingdom; transnational organized crime; international drug control; international code of conduct for information security); XIV. International environmental law (climate change; joint statement on EU's inclusion of aviation into EU emission trading scheme between China and Russia; effects of atomic radiation; use of water resources of cross-border rivers); XV. International law on international organizations (responsibility of international organizations; role of UN and its reforms; UN financing; UN peacekeeping operations; Mr. HUANG Huikang elected as member of the International Law Commission; establishment of Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat; ratification of the Third Protocol Amending the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia); XVI. International law on settlement of disputes (International Court of Justice (ICJ); Ms XUE Hanqin elected as member of the ICJ).