Intergroup Competition Mitigates Effects of Reward Structure on Preference-Consistency Bias and Group Decision Failure

Carsten K W De Dreu,Femke S Ten Velden,Tim R W De Wilde

doi:10.1007/s10726-021-09739-w

Carsten K W De Dreu, Femke S Ten Velden + Show 1 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-021-09739-w

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Abstract

Group discussion often becomes one-sided and confirmatory, with poor decisions as the unfortunate outcome. Here we examine whether intergroup competition amplifies or mitigates effects of individual versus team reward on information sharing biases and group decision quality. Individuals (N = 309) in 103 interacting groups were given private information on four decision alternatives and discussed a joint decision. Private information was distributed such that groups faced a “hidden profile” in which pushing for initial preferences and commonly held information prohibits the group from finding the best alternative. Group members were rewarded for team or individual performance, and groups faced intergroup competition or not. Whereas intergroup competition did not influence common-information bias, we find that when intergroup competition is absent, groups under individual (versus team) reward have stronger preference-consistency bias and make poorer decisions. When intergroup competition is present, however, groups under individual reward perform as good as groups under team reward. Results resonate with the possibility that intergroup competition overshadows within-group rivalry, and can promote even-handed discussions within small groups of decision-makers.

Highlights

In both ancestral and contemporary societies, important decisions are often delegated to and made by small groups of people
In no single group did all members prefer the best alternative before discussion took place, and in only three groups a majority preferred the best alternative
Analysis of Variance with intergroup competition and reward structure as between-groups factors returned main effects for reward structure, F(1, rc9eo9wm) a=pr ed8t.i6stit9or4un,c,ptFu =r(e1 0,.w09a09s4),=sηi g0p2n.0 =if9i 06c.,a0np8t =,1 F (0c(.7o15n, 8f9i,r9mη) p=i2n =5g. 20h7.y05p0,o1tp.h =eTs h0ise.01i2nb4t)e, brηguprt2o n=uop 0t .cf0oo5rm1i.pnetCetiortgniorsoniustpxent with Hypothesis 2 and 3a, we found that stronger preference-consistency bias in groups under individual rather than team reward when intergroup competition was absent (F[1, 99] = 13.490, p < 0.001) rather than present (F[1, 99] < 1) (Fig. 3AB)

Summary

Introduction

In both ancestral and contemporary societies, important decisions are often delegated to and made by small groups of people. One possible advantage of such practice is that groups bring together a broader and more diverse base of information and knowledge that can be used to achieve high quality decisions (Bahrami et al 2010; Laughlin et al 2006). This “two-heads-are-better-than-one” advantage is, off-set by two potent information sharing biases (De Dreu et al 2008; Faber et al 2017; Lu et al 2012; Mesmer-Magnus and DeChurch 2009). The confluence of these information sharing biases has been identified as key to high-profile group decision failures, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion in Fidel Castro’s Cuba in 1961 (Janis and Mann 1977), the Challenger Space Shuttle debacle in 1986 (Esser and Lindoerfer 1989), and the way the Carter Administration dealt with the Iranian-hostage crisis (Aldag and Fuller 1993; Tetlock et al 1992)

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