Interest and Need: Critical Look at their Identification in Russian Law

Abstract

Based on a critical analysis of the doctrinal definitions of the concept of "interest" in sociology, psychology, and law, it is concluded that the prevailing point of view in modern Russian legal theory, i.e. "interest is a conscious need to satisfy a need", is wrongly absolutized. Excessive psychologization of modern legal definitions of interest leads to a direct identification of interests with needs, puts an equal sign between these far from close concepts. It is shown that the widespread use of psychological terminology in legal definitions of interest (In particular, the terms "awareness" and "comprehension"), does not bring any "freshness" in legal knowledge about interests. The vast majority of phenomena, objects, and events in everyday and scientific speech are not considered to be conscious, since the awareness of these phenomena is self-evident. The doctrinal definitions of interests that exist in legal science and highlight their "awareness" as the main feature are practically unsuitable for law enforcement. The author substantiates the conclusion that the widely used legal concept of "interest" needs to be freed from the excessive psychologization of its many meanings, which will, in turn, free itself from the understanding of a conscious need as the only reason for the emergence of interest. It is suggested that the definition of "interest" should be formulated not on specific types or often synonymous meanings of this concept, but on generalizations of a higher order — such as could organically include all currently existing definitions of interest. Only universals can do this. And such a universal is the concept of "well-being".