Underhill Moore's Legal Science: Its Nature and Significance

Abstract

THE legal science of Underhill Moore was product of two major movements of moder legal thought: legal realism and sociological jurisprudence. It demonstrates both strength and limitations of these two legal theories. His work had this somewhat paradoxical character because he substituted scientifically exact methods and deeds for vivid but unverifiable, pseudo-descriptive prose in which these two movements had all too often been previously expressed. When this was done actual capability of a legal science grounded in a realistic application of scientific methods to social and legal facts was revealed to be quite different from what many earlier proponents had claimed. Consequently, more than anyone else Underhill Moore demonstrated precisely what legal realism and sociological jurisprudence as traditionally conceived can and cannot do. And for this reason his work probably marks not merely culmination of jurisprudence of recent past but also a turning point in legal science generally. It is as important, therefore, as a clue to legal science of immediate future as it is to an estimation of remarkable original contributions of Underhill Moore to legal and social science that we become clear about aim, method and results of unique sociology of law which he created and applied. The aim and method of Underhill Moore's legal science are inseparable. This is case because his aim was to provide legal realism and sociological jurisprudence with a rigorous scientific method. Thereby he hoped to achieve at least beginnings of a dependable legal science adequate to changing and novel legal and social problems of our time. The method which he chose was that of natural science applied to social and legal facts. In making this choice he was but following generally accepted claim of most legal realists and social scientists.1 The general conception was that traditional legal and social sciences were inadequate because previous thinkers had trusted to formal logic applied to abstract nouns of propositions purporting to describe the law. This situation, they thought, would be put right when legal and social scientists became realistic and scientific about concrete facts and concrete changing systems of their subject-matter in