Interaction Systems and Power Networks: A Reply to Mouzelis

Abstract

In his attempt to design a Saussurian theory of the interaction order, Nicos Mouzelis (1992) objects to my suggestion as to how to conceptualize the specificity of interaction systems. In an earlier exchange with Anne Rawls (1987, 1988), I used Luhmann's (1982) notion of autopoiesis, the self-referential constitution of various types of social systems, in order to distinguish between interaction, organization, and society as irreducible and emergent forms of social organization (Fuchs 1988, 1989). The level of interaction commonly is identified as micro, as opposed to the macro levels of organization and society, though the micro-macro terminology is not very useful. I suggested that interaction systems are different from those of organization and society because they employ copresence and the duality of perception and communication as their boundary mechanism. As a principle of social selection, copresence imposes a number of important limits on what interaction systems can do: not everyone can talk at the same time; one can talk and listen only to those who are also copresent; it is not possible to establish subsystems that specialize in other communications; and the system is highly vulnerable to conflict and disagreement. Mouzelis argues that this theory ignores stratification and hierarchy. It does not acknowledge that some interactions have more powerful and farther-reaching consequences for larger groups of people than others. Mouzelis thinks that interactions between powerful actors, which he calls collective and mega-actors, should not be likened to interactions between citizens. His conclusion is that some interactions are macro and hence do not belong to the same class as micro interactions. Although this argument several flaws (e.g., the distinction between interaction and organization has nothing prima facie to do with power and size, and is not an ontological distinction), let me concentrate on what I perceive to be the most fundamental flaw: Interactions between powerful actors are still interactions. They experience the same constraints and limitations as ordinary interactions. For example, only those who are copresent can participate in the interaction; issues and problems must be dealt with sequentially; and there is no way to increase complexity through differentiation of the interaction itself. This is why mass democracy is a romantic anachronism: only those few who are copresent can decide, and those who are not present have other things to do and can only hope to be represented properly. This is also why it is notoriously difficult to follow one's syllabus in a seminar: what is possible organizationally (the level of the syllabus) might not be realizable in the actual interaction (the seminar sessions) because interaction systems are less complex than organizations. To take a final example, the state is not an interaction, although it contains interaction systems; thus the tension between what is possible organizationally and what can be realized in interactions explains many of the structural problems that administrations always encounter. Because organizations are not based on copresence, they have a higher degree of complexity and can do various