Intentionality Deconstructed

Abstract

Abstract Intentionality Deconstructed: An Anti-Realist Theory argues for the view that there are, and can be, no intentional states. We may put this view in terms of the truth of content ascriptions: Content ascriptions, in themselves, cannot be true or false—they lack truth conditions—for the concept of intentionality is flawed. Nonetheless, content ascriptions have truth conditions and can be true (or possess a related epistemic merit) relative to practices of content ascription. The suggested view does not deny the existence of those mental states standardly considered intentional, notably the so-called propositional attitudes; it affirms it. That is, the book defends the existence of those states with the properties usually attributed to them, but absent intentional properties. Specifically, it is argued that the so-called propositional attitudes possess logico-syntactic properties. The postulation of such properties plays an important role in addressing the challenge of reconciling intentional anti-realism with beliefs being true or having substitute epistemic merits, the argument from the predictive and explanatory success of content ascription for intentional realism, and the cognitive suicide objection to views that deny intentionality. As part of the rejection of this final objection, intentional anti-realism is presented as a radical view, which replaces traditional talk of content ascriptions with talk of “quoted” logico-syntactic structures, but which can yet give clear sense to its dispute with its rivals as well as to its own superiority.