Intentional Anti-Realism II

Abstract

Abstract Chapter 6 further develops intentional anti-realism, and rebuffs objections. First, it criticizes the argument from the explanatory and predictive success of content ascriptions for intentional realism. It is argued that this success is due to the fact that mental states possess logico-syntactic structures, which content ascriptions also ascribe. At the same time, it is argued (following Egan) that ascribing contents to mental states allows for the explanation of types of explananda that are of interest to us. The notion of thick logico-syntactic structures is further developed, and it is argued that such structures are naturalistically individuated. The chapter then addresses the cognitive suicide charge against intentional anti-realism. It is admitted that, according to intentional anti-realism, whereas “There are no mental states” is true, it isn’t true that there are no intentional states. However, this implication is argued to be a legitimate characteristic of a radical philosophy. The chapter ends with another argument for intentional anti-realism, which applies Ockham’s razor.