Intention und Wirklichkeit. Von der Konzeption zur Ratifizierung des deutsch-französischen Vertrages

Abstract

By proposing the European Political Union (Fouchet Plan), General de Gaulle had wanted to get the political unification process which had been stagnating for quite some time, under way again. The Union was not only meant as a political superstructure to the existing Communities (which in his eyes had a more or less «technical«role to play), but should help overcome the East-West stalemate and give Europe the say to which it was entitled. France and Germany were to be its indispensable motor. When the Fouchet Plan failed, the General and Chancellor Adenauer drove towards a genuine union between France and Germany which, they firmly believed, the other four would join if only the two of them went straightforwardly ahead. This gave rise to the idea of the Franco-German Treaty of January 1963. But hardly signed, the Treaty met with such savage opposition from all Western political quarters and the «European integrationists» (as well as that of the Soviets) that it was on the brink of failure. The political circles and the press in Germany, frightened at that reaction, emsily adopted the idea of a preamble to the Treaty. Even Adenauer, much against his feelings, had to put up with it. Thus the Treaty, instead of paving the way to a «genuine merger» between the two nations and thus of the Europe of Six, was reduced to nothing more than an agreement on regular consultations.