Intelligence warning in the corporate sector: the 2013 In Amenas terrorist attack in retrospect

Abstract

ABSTRACT The 2013 terrorist attack at the In Amenas, Algeria gas production facility killed 40 innocent people and shook the corporate security industry. Analyzing this event raises important questions about the nature and limitations of intelligence warning for private industry. Corporate security intelligence has been adopted by many companies that desire a ‘decision advantage’, but in this case, it failed to foresee the attack. A seminal report on the attack produced by Statoil (now Equinor) encouraged numerous changes in how companies should protect themselves against severe security threats. One conclusion was that in uncertain and dangerous environments, intelligence cannot be relied upon to reduce uncertainty and provide adequate warning. The Statoil report acknowledges that the joint venture likely would not have gotten the intelligence necessary to warn of an impending attack. The core business is not necessarily focused on the changing threat environment. In this case, even more accurate ‘tactical’ intelligence might not have led to a timely evacuation. Moreover, as the Algerian Army's failure to prevent the In Amenas attack reveals, corporations' risk assessments cannot ignore the severe limitations of their host country security institutions. This case study raises some concerns about overvaluing corporate intelligence’s effectiveness in high-risk security environments.