Abstract
Any theory amenable to scientific inquiry must have testable consequences. This minimal criterion is uniquely challenging for the study of consciousness, as we do not know if it is possible to confirm via observation from the outside whether or not a physical system knows what it feels like to have an inside—a challenge referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness. To arrive at a theory of consciousness, the hard problem has motivated development of phenomenological approaches that adopt assumptions of what properties consciousness has based on first-hand experience and, from these, derive the physical processes that give rise to these properties. A leading theory adopting this approach is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which assumes our subjective experience is a “unified whole”, subsequently yielding a requirement for physical feedback as a necessary condition for consciousness. Here, we develop a mathematical framework to assess the validity of this assumption by testing it in the context of isomorphic physical systems with and without feedback. The isomorphism allows us to isolate changes in without affecting the size or functionality of the original system. Indeed, the only mathematical difference between a “conscious” system with and an isomorphic “philosophical zombie” with is a permutation of the binary labels used to internally represent functional states. This implies is sensitive to functionally arbitrary aspects of a particular labeling scheme, with no clear justification in terms of phenomenological differences. In light of this, we argue any quantitative theory of consciousness, including IIT, should be invariant under isomorphisms if it is to avoid the existence of isomorphic philosophical zombies and the epistemological problems they pose.
Highlights
The scientific study of consciousness walks a fine line between physics and metaphysics
We argue any quantitative theory of consciousness, including Information Theory (IIT), should be invariant under isomorphisms if it is to avoid the existence of isomorphic philosophical zombies and the epistemological problems they pose
We are prepared to demonstrate the existence of isomorphic feed-forward philosophical zombies in systems similar to those found in Oizumi et al [5]
Summary
The scientific study of consciousness walks a fine line between physics and metaphysics. There are observable consequences to what we intuitively describe as consciousness. For example, is an outward behavior that is uncontroversially associated with a lower overall level of consciousness. Scientists can decipher what is intrinsically experienced when humans are conscious via verbal reports or other outward signs of awareness. By studying the physiology of the brain during these specific behaviors, scientists can study “neuronal correlates of consciousness”. (NCCs), which point to where in the brain conscious experience is generated and what physiological processes correlate with it [1]. NCCs cannot be used to explain why we are conscious or to predict whether or not another system demonstrating similar properties to NCCs is conscious
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