The Equations for Consciousness: A Reply to “Tracking the Travels,” a Review of Journey of the Mind

<i>Human and Animal Minds: The Consciousness Questions Laid to Rest</i>

Towards solving the hard problem of consciousness: The varieties of brain resonances and the conscious experiences that they support

Summary In the last decade, Guilio Tononi has developed the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness. IIT postulates that consciousness is equal to integrated information (F). The goal of this paper is to show that IIT fails in its stated goal of quantifying consciousness. The paper will challenge the theoretical and empirical arguments in support of IIT. The main theoretical argument for the relevance of integrated information to consciousness is the principle of information exclusion. Yet, no justification is given to support this principle. Tononi claims there is significant empirical support for IIT, but this is called into question by the creation of a trivial theory of consciousness with equal explanatory power. After examining the theoretical and empirical evidence for IIT, arguments from philosophy of mind and epistemology will be examined. Since IIT is not a form of computational functionalism, it is vulnerable to fading/ dancing qualia arguments. Finally, the limitations of the phenomenological approach to studying consciousness are examined, and it will be shown that IIT is a theory of protoconsciousness rather than a theory of consciousness.

Reviews

Consciousness is a central issue in neuroscience, however, we still lack a formal framework that can address the nature of the relationship between consciousness and its physical substrates. In this review, we provide a novel mathematical framework of category theory (CT), in which we can define and study the sameness between different domains of phenomena such as consciousness and its neural substrates. CT was designed and developed to deal with the relationships between various domains of phenomena. We introduce three concepts of CT which include (i) category; (ii) inclusion functor and expansion functor; and, most importantly, (iii) natural transformation between the functors. Each of these mathematical concepts is related to specific features in the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). In this novel framework, we will examine two of the major theories of consciousness, integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness and temporospatial theory of consciousness (TTC). We conclude that CT, especially the application of the notion of natural transformation, highlights that we need to go beyond NCC and unravels questions that need to be addressed by any future neuroscientific theory of consciousness.

Consciousness or conscious experience is a mental phenomenon that is familiar to all of us, but the way in which it is produced escapes us to a large extent. Each person has a vague idea of what it means to be conscious, but consciousness is rather hard to define, albeit easy to identify. It is that function of the brain that makes us conscious of external or internal stimuli and of our thoughts regarding these subjective experiences. Conscious experience is a first-person perspective of mental states and events tracking as they unfold. It includes mental phenomena such as a perception, emotion, memory, idea, continuous temporal sequence of events. A mental process and its adjoining neurophysiological phenomena represent two aspects of the same event. We have direct access to the mental aspect, while we can observe the neurophysiological aspect only when we study the event as a biological process. The psychological study of consciousness describes the special properties of this brain function, its origin and utility in the global economy of an animal organism. The neurobiological study aims to find the neural correlates of consciousness, aims to establish causal relations between the neural phenomena and the different conscious states. Lastly, the formulation of an explanatory theory can provide a satisfactory understanding of the phenomenon. This review aims to bring some clarification in the field of consciousness, selecting the hypotheses which mostly fulfill the requirements, in order to be confirmed as explanatory theories. A valuable test for confirming an explanatory hypothesis is its predictive power. Using this criterion we have evaluated comparatively, some of the proposed explaining hypotheses.

Gamma-ray bursts are the most luminous electromagnetic events in the Universe. Their prompt gamma-ray emission has typical durations between a fraction of a second and several minutes. A rare subset of these events have durations in excess of a thousand seconds, referred to as ultra-long gamma-ray bursts. Here, we report the discovery of the longest gamma-ray burst ever seen with a $\sim$25 000 s gamma-ray duration, GRB 250702B, and characterize this event using data from four instruments in the InterPlanetary Network and the Monitor of All-sky X-ray Image. We find a hard spectrum, subsecond variability, and high total energy, which are only known to arise from ultrarelativistic jets powered by a rapidly spinning stellar-mass central engine. These properties and the extreme duration are together incompatible with all confirmed gamma-ray burst progenitors and nearly all models in the literature. This burst is naturally explained with the helium merger model, where a field binary ends when a black hole falls into a stripped star and proceeds to consume and explode it from within. Under this paradigm, GRB 250702B adds to the growing evidence that helium stars expand and that some ultra-long GRBs have similar evolutionary pathways as collapsars, stellar-mass gravitational wave sources, and potentially rare types of supernovae.

The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) might be our current best bet at a scientific explanation of phenomenal consciousness. IIT focuses on the distinctively subjective and phenomenological aspects of conscious experience. Currently, it offers the fundaments of a formal account, but future developments shall explain the qualitative structures of every possible conscious experience. But this ambitious project is hindered by one fundamental limitation. IIT fails to acknowledge the crucial roles of attention in generating phenomenally conscious experience and shaping its contents. Here, we argue that IIT urgently needs an account of attention. Without this account, IIT cannot explain important informational differences between different kinds of experiences. Furthermore, though some IIT proponents celebratedly endorse a double dissociation between consciousness and attention, close analysis reveals that such as dissociation is in fact incompatible with IIT. Notably, the issues we raise for IIT will likely arise for many internalist theories of conscious contents in philosophy, especially theories with primitivist inclinations. Our arguments also extend to the recently popularized structuralist approaches. Overall, our discussion highlights how considerations about attention are indispensable for scientific as well as philosophical theorizing about conscious experience.

Theories of consciousness using neurobiological data or being influenced by these data have been focused either on states of consciousness or contents of consciousness. These theories have occasionally used evidence from psychophysical phenomena where conscious experience is a dependent experimental variable. However, systematic catalog of many such relevant phenomena has not been offered in terms of these theories. In the perceptual retouch theory of thalamocortical interaction, recently developed to become a blend with the dendritic integration theory, consciousness states and contents of consciousness are explained by the same mechanism. This general-purpose mechanism has modulation of the cortical layer-5 pyramidal neurons that represent contents of consciousness as its core. As a surplus, many experimental psychophysical phenomena of conscious perception can be explained by the workings of this mechanism. Historical origins and current views inherent in this theory are presented and reviewed.

Higher-order theories are theories of phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is the property of there being something that it is like for one to have an experience. Something that it is like from the point of view of the organism. According to the higher-order approach, an organism is phenomenally conscious just in case it has an appropriate kind of inner awareness of itself as being in some mental state or other. So, when one consciously believes that Kentucky is south New York one is aware of oneself as believing that Kentucky is south of New York. Similarly, when one consciously sees red, or experiences fear, one is aware of oneself as seeing red or being afraid. The relevant kind of inner awareness is what distinguishes the various kinds of higher-order theories. One might think that the right kind of inner awareness would be a kind of inner perception. Yet contemporary psychology and neuroscience do not seem to support the idea of a kind of inner sense. We do, in addition, become aware of things by thinking about them as being present. This has inspired the higher-order thought theory of consciousness, which was first explicitly developed in the 1990s. There are many different kinds of higher-order thought theories. One version, the Relational Model, claims that the first-order state is transformed into a phenomenally conscious state when one becomes aware of that very state via having a higher-order thought. In addition, there are Joint-Determination Models which hold that the higher-order content and first-order content are part of the same mental state. These come in at least two varieties: the Same-Order Model and the Split-Level Model. These are distinguished by how they respond to worries about misrepresentation. In addition, there are Non-relational models which hold that the relevant higher-order state determines what it is like for one to have a conscious experience. Finally, there are non-standard higher-order theories that appeal to acquaintance or mental quotation.

The scientific study of consciousness is currently undergoing a critical transition in the form of a rapidly evolving scientific debate regarding whether or not currently proposed theories can be assessed for their scientific validity. At the forefront of this debate is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), widely regarded as the preeminent theory of consciousness because it quantified subjective experience in a scalar mathematical measure called that is in principle measurable. Epistemological issues in the form of the “unfolding argument” have provided a concrete refutation of IIT by demonstrating how it permits functionally identical systems to have differences in their predicted consciousness. The implication is that IIT and any other proposed theory based on a physical system’s causal structure may already be falsified even in the absence of experimental refutation. However, so far many of these arguments surrounding the epistemological foundations of falsification arguments, such as the unfolding argument, are too abstract to determine the full scope of their implications. Here, we make these abstract arguments concrete, by providing a simple example of functionally equivalent machines realizable with table-top electronics that take the form of isomorphic digital circuits with and without feedback. This allows us to explicitly demonstrate the different levels of abstraction at which a theory of consciousness can be assessed. Within this computational hierarchy, we show how IIT is simultaneously falsified at the finite-state automaton level and unfalsifiable at the combinatorial-state automaton level. We use this example to illustrate a more general set of falsification criteria for theories of consciousness: to avoid being already falsified, or conversely unfalsifiable, scientific theories of consciousness must be invariant with respect to changes that leave the inference procedure fixed at a particular level in a computational hierarchy.

One of the major problems in contemporary philosophy of mind is the dualism of first-person and third-person perspectives — the question of whether conscious experience is public and epistemically accessible or private and qualitative. Recognising the relevance of the arguments of both sides, naturalists and anti-naturalists, I attempt to resolve this dichotomy using Bruno Latour’s methodology on the theories of Immanuel Kant and Moritz Schlick. To do so, I propose not to reduce the theory of consciousness to one interpretation, but to consider conscious experience as a “boundary object” between the spheres of the private and the public, the accessible and the qualitative, the unique and the reproducible. Through the “practice of translation” I demonstrate the failure of ontologies of conscious experience proposed by both naturalism and anti-naturalism, and propose an “intersectional theory” as an alternative theory of conscious experience that affirms, on the one hand, the uniqueness of the individual’s epistemic position and, on the other hand, its reproducibility and communicability. I introduce the term “intersectional locality” to denote the ontological status of conscious experience. In the next step, I return to the necessary (according to Latour) “practice of purification” of those epistemic zones whose fusion was outlined earlier, which allows me to recognise the intuition behind the dichotomy of the two perspectives as legitimate and requiring conceptualisation. The mediation of Schlick’s positivist theory and Kant’s transcendentalist theory allows us to present first-person and third-person perspectives as two epistemic registers, subordinated to the position of a historically specific conscious subject. I treat the first-person perspective as a reflective power of judgment, and the third-person perspective as a determinative power of judgment; doing so, I establish the connection between the qualitative interpretation of phenomenal experience and the aesthetic principle of the reflective power of judgment. I conclude that conscious experience as a subject matter of research is a hybrid object, and only the project of “nonmodern” science will make it possible to create a relevant theory of consciousness that does not resort to reduction.

One of the most mysterious phenomena in science is the nature of conscious experience. Due to its subjective nature, a reductionist approach is having a hard time in addressing some fundamental questions about consciousness. These questions are squarely and quantitatively tackled by a recently developed theoretical framework, called integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. In particular, IIT proposes that a maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS) is identical to conscious experience. However, there has been no principled way to assess the claimed identity. Here, we propose to apply a mathematical formalism, category theory, to assess the proposed identity and suggest that it is important to consider if there exists a proper translation between the domain of conscious experience and that of the MICS. If such translation exists, we postulate that questions in one domain can be answered in the other domain; very difficult questions in the domain of consciousness can be resolved in the domain of mathematics. We claim that it is possible to empirically test if such a functor exists, by using a combination of neuroscientific and computational approaches. Our general, principled and empirical framework allows us to assess the relationship between the domain of consciousness and the domain of mathematical structures, including those suggested by IIT.

There are plenty of issues to be solved in order for researchers to agree on a neural model of consciousness. Here we emphasize an often under-represented aspect in the debate: time consciousness. Consciousness and the present moment both extend in time. Experience flows through a succession of moments and progresses from future predictions, to present experiences, to past memories. However, a brief review finds that many dominant theories of consciousness only refer to brief, static, and discrete “functional moments” of time. Very few refer to more extended, dynamic, and continuous time, which is associated with conscious experience (cf. the “experienced moment”). This confusion between short and discrete versus long and continuous is, we argue, one of the core issues in theories of consciousness. Given the lack of work dedicated to time consciousness, its study could test novel predictions of rival theories of consciousness. It may be that different theories of consciousness are compatible/complementary if the different aspects of time are taken into account. Or, if it turns out that no existing theory can fully accommodate time consciousness, then perhaps it has something new to add. Regardless of outcome, the crucial step is to make subjective time a central object of study.

The article explores the question of whether an artificial intelligence (AI) system can attain human consciousness. The authors critically examine the current state of research in neuroscience, anthropology, and philosophy, highlighting the sig­nificant challenges posed by the limitations of computational power and the ar­chitecture of modern AI systems. The article proposes a distinction between theoretical and instrumental approaches to determining the level of conscious­ness in AI. By considering the most authoritative theories of consciousness in neuroscience and cognitive philosophy, such as the Global Workspace Theory, Integrated Information Theory, Spatiotemporal Theory, and Evolutionary Theory of Consciousness, the authors argue that the emergence of consciousness in a material system requires an integral architecture, adaptability, and the ability to master self-control. An analysis of instrumental tests for the presence of con­sciousness shows that consciousness can only be assessed based on behavior in the real world, and also demonstrates the limitations and risks of anthropo­morphic perceptions of the object of study. The authors advocate for the synthe­sis of theoretical and instrumental approaches in the research and design of AI, emphasizing the importance of interdisciplinary studies to advance the under­standing and potential replication of human consciousness in artificial systems. Clear criteria for determining the presence of consciousness in AI systems are proposed, and the ethical implications of this technological achievement are con­sidered. The study concludes with a discussion of the potential challenges huma­nity may face if AI systems are endowed with consciousness, stressing the im­portance of a cautious and well-considered approach to such a complex issue.