Abstract
Chapter 7 argues that (non-trivial) principles of rationality cannot fully capture the nature of our instrumentally rational powers. A fully rational agent not only complies with the principle of instrumental rationality but also exhibits a number of instrumental virtues of character. An agent suffers a defect of rationality insofar as she fails to have one of these virtues, or insofar as she manifests one of its corresponding vices. However, an agent can manifest instrumental vices without violating any principle of rationality. This chapter proposes that courage is one of the instrumental virtues, and shows how one of its corresponding vices, cowardice, must be understood as a defect of our rational powers.
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