Abstract
We study the strategies used by experimental subjects in repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma games to identify the underlying motivations behind instrumental reciprocity, that is, reciprocation of cooperation only if there is future interaction. Importantly, we designed the games so that instrumental reciprocity is a mistake for payoff-maximizing individuals irrespective of their beliefs. We find that, despite the fact that instrumental reciprocity is suboptimal, it is one of the most frequently used cooperative strategies. Moreover, although the use of instrumental reciprocity is sensitive to the costs of deviating from the payoff-maximizing strategy, these costs alone cannot explain the high frequency with which subjects choose to reciprocate instrumentally.
Highlights
Experiments have shown that individuals often use reciprocal strategies in repeated games and seem well aware of the fact that reciprocity can be used instrumentally
It is possible that instrumental reciprocity instead reflects the use of general reputation-building heuristics individuals have learned to apply over the course of their lives [13]
We report the results of an experiment where individuals play a sequential prisoners’ dilemma with possible future interaction where always defect is the only rational strategy for second movers who maximize material payoffs, even if they believe that first movers are reciprocators
Summary
Experiments have shown that individuals often use reciprocal strategies in repeated games and seem well aware of the fact that reciprocity can be used instrumentally. Deciding whether it is optimal or not to reciprocate someone’s cooperation in situations where there is possible future interaction is not a trivial task, even for calculative individuals In this view, subjects use instrumental reciprocity strategies even if they do not maximize material. We design an experiment that allows us to observe the use of instrumental reciprocity among experienced subjects in a setting where we are certain that it is an error from the point of view of material-payoff maximization. This design allows us to identify players who use instrumental reciprocity because they are willing to reciprocate cooperation by first movers in the first repetition of the SPD game but plan to defect if first movers cooperate in the second repetition of the SPD game (if played) We refer to this strategy as reciprocate defect. We find that the strategy always reciprocate is not sensitive to the gains to cooperation
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
