Abstract
This paper examines the tactical interaction between drones and tanks in modern warfare through game theory, particularly focusing on Stackelberg equilibrium and backward induction. It describes a high-stakes conflict between two teams: one using advanced drones for attack, and the other defending using tanks. The paper conceptualizes this as a sequential game, illustrating the complex strategic dynamics similar to Stackelberg competition, where moves and countermoves are carefully analyzed and predicted.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
