Institutions as constraints and resources: Explaining cross‐national divergence in performance management

Virginia Doellgast,David Marsden

doi:10.1111/1748-8583.12214

Abstract

AbstractThis article compares performance management practices in call centres from four telecommunications firms in the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, and Germany. Findings show that different combinations of institutional constraints, such as strong job security protections, and participation resources supporting worker voice were influential in shaping choices among policies to motivate and discipline workers. Performance management most closely approached a high‐involvement model where both constraints and resources were high, where worker representatives were able both to restrict management's use of sanctions and to establish procedures that improved the perceived fairness of incentives. Findings contribute to debates concerning the role of contextual factors in the design and effectiveness of HRM.

Highlights

A large body of comparative research has shown that institutions at national and workplace levels can influence firms' human resource (HR) practices (Doucouliagos, Freeeman, & Laroche, 2017; Katz & Darbishire, 2000; Marsden, 1999; Maurice, Sellier, & Silvestre, 1986)
We develop a framework for analysing the impact that different combinations of institutional resources and constraints have on the practices firms use to motivate and compensate their workforce, which we broadly place under the rubric of performance management
We argue that where these conditions apply, performance management is most likely to approach a high‐involvement model, relying on a combination of coordination by mutual adjustment and incentive‐based performance management (Guthrie, 2001)

Summary

Introduction

A large body of comparative research has shown that institutions at national and workplace levels can influence firms' human resource (HR) practices (Doucouliagos, Freeeman, & Laroche, 2017; Katz & Darbishire, 2000; Marsden, 1999; Maurice, Sellier, & Silvestre, 1986). We focus here on formal institutions established through law and collective bargaining, including employment protections, works councils and their participation or co‐determination rights, and union agreements and their provisions. These could include, for example, strong job security rights, based on national legislation or collective agreements, which limit management's ability to dismiss workers on the basis of poor performance.

Results

Conclusion