Institutional Investor Protection Pressures versus Firm Incentives in the Disclosure of Integrated Reporting

Abstract

AbstractCorporate disclosures aim to decrease the expectation gap between investors, decrease the advantage of informed investors and consequently reduce information asymmetry. However, the existence of higher numbers of companies’ reports makes the decision making of firms’ stakeholders difficult. To avoid these problems, companies have started to disclose integrated reports. Previous studies have observed that this voluntary corporate disclosure is a consequence of large firms’ incentives associated with preventing abnormal earnings. In this paper, we examine whether these internal factors have a lower/higher impact than institutional contracting pressures. Our results are evidence that firms’ incentives are the main determinants of the voluntary disclosure of integrated reports, and we observe that there is a substitutive role between institutional country pressures and firms’ transparency decisions. However, the contracting environment plays a complementary role when firms suffer from lower asymmetry problems.