Ownership concentration, voluntary disclosures and information asymmetry in New Zealand

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of different classes of ownership concentration on information asymmetry conditional upon corporate voluntary disclosures in New Zealand. The current paper attempts to extend this stream of research by incorporating three mutually exclusive ownership structures and considering the interactive relationship between such ownership structures and corporate voluntary disclosures. Results reveal that ownership concentration in general is significantly positively associated with bid-ask spreads (proxy for information asymmetry) observed around annual report release dates. This finding supports the adverse selection hypothesis and importantly this effect is found to be most pronounced for financial institutions and management-controlled ownership categories. When voluntary disclosure is taken into account, the findings demonstrate that disclosures significantly attenuate information asymmetry risk associated with ownership concentration. This effect is particularly pronounced for firms with management-controlled ownership structures. The findings highlight the importance of corporate disclosures under concentrated ownership structures especially management-controlled ownership structures in reducing information asymmetry and enhancing market efficiency in New Zealand.