Abstract
This paper explores the different effects of stress-resistant and stress-sensitive institutional investors on systemic financial risk in China. We show that systemic financial risk decreases with stress-resistant institutional shareholding but increase with stress-sensitive institutional shareholding. Two mediation mechanisms and two moderation mechanisms of analysts’ attention and stock price bubbles are identified. Specifically, the analysts’ attention presents a negative mediating effect and positive moderating effect between stress-resistant institutional shareholding and systemic financial risk, while stock price bubbles exhibit a negative mediating effect and positive moderating effect between stress-sensitive institutional shareholding and systemic financial risk. Our paper highlights the importance of appropriately guiding institutional investors to regulatory authorities, especially when institutional investors are encouraged to participate in Chinese stock markets.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
