Abstract
The conceptual problem underlying this discussion is how to accommodate collectivities such as trade unions (or large-scale, complex, and bureaucratic business enterprises) in an essentially individualistic economic theory. Are the decision-making processes and motivations of a structurally complex political institution sufficiently like those of individuals that the theoretical assumptions about individual economic behavior are also valid for the behavior of trade unions? Many labor economists would answer this question in the negative. The author of this article argues that the recent attacks against orthodox economic theory as applied to labor organizations are not convincing and that until a more satisfactory tool of analysis is found, economic theory will yield better predictive results than an interdisciplinary approach to understanding trade union behavior. (Author's abstract courtesy EBSCO.)
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