Institutional Anomie Theory and Country-Level Public Corruption

Abstract

Public-sector corruption siphons trillions of dollars from the global economy and contributes to social instability. Institutional Anomie Theory, with its focus on the links between social institutions, individualistic and achievement-oriented cultural norms, and crime, offers a possible framework for understanding corruption. This possibility is contrasted with research indicating that individualistic values and free markets reduce corruption. Using twenty years of data from 83 countries, this study finds institutional imbalance toward the economy is associated with higher levels of corruption. The lowest levels of corruption are found in highly individualistic countries, though institutional imbalance had a strong positive effect on corruption in such countries. Conversely, corruption is high in collectivistic countries regardless of institutional imbalance. Findings underscore the importance of institutional and cultural configurations, and their interplay, for corruption. We discuss the implications of our study for Institutional Anomie Theory and directions for future research.