Abstract
Stable transfer contracts are essential for the development of the land market. This analysis investigates the impacts of different institutions and their interactive effects on the stability of land transfer contracts in rural China. Based on a survey dataset of 833 farmers from three provinces, we demonstrate that tenure institutions have a significantly positive effect and that informal social relationships have a significantly negative effect. Additionally, rules that are relevant to village self-governance strengthen the effect of formal tenure institutions and weaken the effect of social relationships. This finding indicates that complementary and substitute interactive effects exist between these two groups of institutions.
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