Insisting on Action in Education: Students are Unique but not Irreplaceable

Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens,Julien Kloeg

doi:10.1007/s11217-020-09716-x

Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens, Julien Kloeg

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-020-09716-x

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Abstract

Biesta distinguishes three functions of education: qualification, socialization and subjectification. We focus on subjectification. When first addressing this concept, Biesta referred to action as defined by Arendt, thereby stressing the importance of ‘the question of freedom’. More recently, the question of freedom (Arendt) is replaced by ‘the question of responsibility’ (Levinas). For Levinas responsibility is related to irreplaceability. While the concept of responsibility is valuable, we question the call upon irreplaceability in education. Actively taking responsibility where irreplaceability might not be either present or felt should be central to education. Unlike the morally clear examples invoked by Biesta, complex societal issues like the climate and refugee crisis are not accessible as an immediate appeal to a specific subject. Therefore, we propose a return to Arendt and her concept of action. Action allows and requires students to create the world anew, to take a position without pretending that the outcome can be controlled. Biesta refers to this as the impossibility of education. However, rather than repeating the theme of impossibility, we focus on the possibilities of education: there are several ways to create the world anew.

Highlights

Recognizing and emphasizing the possibilities of the subject beyond the structure of soci‐ ety has long been a focal point of criti‐ cal traditions within the philosophy of education
In Arendt’s work we find resources that point out the dependence of action on an institutional “space of appearance” (Benhabib 2018, 110) and a shared world (Noordegraaf-Eelens et al 2019) as well as on conditions of plurality and equality (Arendt 1998, 7–9)
The Levinasian critique aimed against a third-person theory of subjectivity is that it grows out of a humanism—“a truth about the human”—against the background of a societal crisis of humanism, which over the course of the twentieth century has been revealed as “not sufficiently human” (Biesta 2008, 200–201)

Summary

Introduction

Recognizing and emphasizing the possibilities of the subject beyond the structure of soci‐ ety (for instance, with a view to transforming society) has long been a focal point of criti‐ cal traditions within the philosophy of education. Subjectification involves the “subjectivity of the human person” in excess of the given social order into which they are inserted (Biesta 2012, 13) This concept at the same time exposes a challenge facing progressive or critical education both in theory and in practice. Arendt develops her own concept of uniqueness in relation to our shared world; at the same time, human subjectivity is not something that is called upon by others In Arendt’s work we find resources that point out the dependence of action on an institutional “space of appearance” (Benhabib 2018, 110) and a shared world (Noordegraaf-Eelens et al 2019) as well as on conditions of plurality and equality (Arendt 1998, 7–9) All of these seem to us to be important elements that educa‐ tional theory and practice should address. Biesta has discussed the “beautiful risk of education” in more recent work (2015b)

From Action to Responsibility

Redefining Subjectivity

Insisting on Action and the Possibilities of Education

Education as Taking Responsibilities

Conclusion