On Folk Conceptions of Mind, Agency and Morality

Abstract

Folk conceptions of mind comprise, among other things, concepts of dispositional traits like generosity, stubbornness and wickedness, concepts of propositional attitudes like beliefs, desires and intentions, concepts of emotions like anger, guilt and love, and concepts of mental actions such as choices and decisions. In addition to concepts of mental actions, folk conceptions of agency comprise concepts of behavioral actions, and classifications of types of both behavioral and mental actions – intentional versus unintentional action, free versus non-free action, and free choice versus non-free choice. Folk conceptions of morality comprise, among other things, concepts of norms and obligations, concepts of responsibility, such as blameworthiness or praiseworthiness, and concepts of vices and virtues. There are many apparent connections between these folk conceptions. The classification of different types of observable behaviors may depend on their mental etiology. A basic notion of action may be part of the folk concept of obligation, if one considers such a concept as a one-place predicate with a placeholder for action (e.g., Jackendoff, 1999).