Information sharing strategies and carbon emission reduction in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain

Abstract

This paper studies information sharing problem in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). We assume that the retailer possesses private demand information and consumers have low-carbon preference. We focus on the retailer’s incentive to share the private demand information with other chain members, adopt the Stackelberg game to acquire the equilibrium results of four information sharing models and discuss the effects of information sharing behavior on chain members’ decisions. We show that although an informed manufacturer can obtain more expected profits, it is a bad choice for the retailer to share demand information with the manufacturer. Then, we find that when the manufacturer pays an appropriate demand information fee to the retailer, the retailer will take the initiative to share demand information with the manufacturer. We also find that a higher consumers’ low-carbon preference will increase chain members’ expected profits. And a lower channel substitution rate is of great benefit to chain members’ expected profits.