Impact of Information Sharing Modes on the Dual-Channel Closed Loop Supply Chains Under Different Power Structures

Abstract

In this paper, we develop game-theoretic models regarding dual-channel closed loop supply chain (CLSC) to identify whether the retailer has incentives to share private demand information with the manufacturer and/or the collector, and how different information sharing modes influence the chain members’ operational performances under different channel power structures. Given that the collector recycles used products, four information sharing modes (i.e., no information sharing, information sharing with the manufacturer, information sharing with the collector, and information sharing with both the manufacturer and the collector) are examined in the manufacturer Stackelberg and collector Stackelberg supply chains, respectively. We find that the retailer’s sharing information behavior always benefits for the collector and the entire supply chain. The retailer, however, has no incentive to share demand information voluntarily. As for the manufacturer, the retailer’s sharing information behavior always benefits him in the collector Stackelberg scenario, while may hurt him in the manufacturer Stackelberg scenario. Furthermore, the impact of channel power structure in the four information sharing modes is also discussed. The results show that the manufacturer Stackelberg model or the collector Stackelberg model may be the better structure for chain members depending on the retailer’s demand forecast accuracy.