Abstract

Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper proposes a new information acquisition mechanism for intelligent mine construction, which solves the problem of incomplete information acquisition in the construction of new intelligent mining area and reduces the difficulty of information acquisition, which solves the problem of the imperfect mine information acquisition in the construction of a new smart mine regions and decreases the difficulty of a mine information acquisition. Based on the evolutionary game model, the perceptual incentive model based on group is established. The reliability of information collection is ensured by sharing and modifying the information collector. Through the analysis of the simulation results, it is found that the regional coverage model based on the cooperation in game theory and evolutionary game theory has a good effect on solving the bottleneck problem of the current intelligent mining area. This paper has an enlightening effect on the optimization of the mine information acquisition system. Through the improvement of the mine information acquisition system, the working efficiency of the information acquisition terminal can be effectively increased by 6%.

Highlights

  • Most of the mining companies in the world are traditional mining companies

  • Many workers are unable to use information collection equipment and are reluctant to collect information in the higher risk region. This directly leads to the incomplete information acquisition [1]

  • There are many researches on information acquisition mechanism based on evolutionary game theory

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Summary

Introduction

Most of the mining companies in the world are traditional mining companies. They use the traditional mining information acquisition mechanism and the daily inspection information of the skilled workers as the daily operation indicators of the mine. Many workers are unable to use information collection equipment and are reluctant to collect information in the higher risk region. This directly leads to the incomplete information acquisition [1]. The measurement error and the insufficient information coverage make it impossible to conduct the stable measures in a high-risk region. This implies the danger of the safety construction of the mining region. The corporate culture of the traditionally heavy industry company leads to the vicious competition among information collectors and the poor degree of information fusion.

Related Work
Region Maximization Incentive Mechanism
Evolutionary Game Incentive Model
Findings
Conclusions
Full Text
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